



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1982-12

Persian gulf security: the United States and
Oman, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and
western allied participation.

Gawlik, Joseph Anthony

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/20298>

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NA 93940

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

PERSIAN GULF SECURITY: THE UNITED STATES
AND OMAN, THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL,
AND WESTERN ALLIED PARTICIPATION

by

Joseph Anthony Gawlik

December 1982

Thesis Advisor

Ralph H. Magnus

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

T207928

Unclassified

LIBRARY, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CA 93940

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Persian Gulf Security; The United States and Oman, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Western Allied Participation		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis December 1982
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Joseph Anthony Gawlik		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE December 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 124
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Persian Gulf Oman Gulf Cooperation Council		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis examines Persian Gulf security from a geostrategic and historical perspective. It emphasizes the current relationship between the United States and Oman and offers the opinion that this is not the best policy course for the U.S. Secondly, the thesis proposes two alternative routes for Gulf security by examining the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council and Western Allied contributions toward Gulf defense.		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014-6601

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

Unclassified

~~SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered~~

The thesis concludes with a look at the advantages and disadvantages of the various Gulf security policies and proposes a new course for U.S. policy in the region.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Persian Gulf Security: The United States
and Oman, the Gulf Cooperation Council,
and Western Allied Participation

by

Joseph Anthony Gawlik
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., University of Dayton, 1970

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1982

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Persian Gulf security from a geostrategic and historical perspective. It emphasizes the current relationship between the United States and Oman and offers the opinion that this is not the best policy for the U.S.

Secondly, the thesis proposes two alternative routes for Gulf security by examining the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council and Western Allied contributions toward Gulf defense.

The thesis concludes with a look at the advantages and disadvantages of the various Gulf security policies and proposes a new course for U.S. policy in the region.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	8
	FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1 -----	10
II.	THE GULF -----	11
	A. GEOGRAPHIC FACTS -----	11
	B. NOMENCLATURE -----	12
	C. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE -----	13
	D. HISTORICAL FACTS -----	14
	1. Extra-Regional Actors -----	14
	2. Local Actors -----	15
	E. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES -----	18
	FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II -----	21
III.	OMAN -----	22
	A. HISTORICAL SETTING -----	22
	1. Background -----	22
	2. Ibadite Islam -----	24
	3. Tribalism -----	26
	4. Ruling Family -----	30
	B. CHALLENGES TO THE SULTANATE -----	33
	1. Internal -----	33
	2. Oil-precipitated Conflicts -----	35
	3. Dhofar Rebellion -----	36
	C. SUPPORT FOR THE SULTANATE -----	41
	1. United Kingdom -----	41
	2. United States -----	43
	FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III -----	52

IV. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL -----	56
A. EVOLUTION -----	56
1. Past Regional Organizations -----	56
2. Gulf Security Plans -----	61
B. STRUCTURE -----	66
C. SECRETARY-GENERAL -----	67
D. ECONOMIC ISSUES -----	69
1. Labor -----	69
2. Infrastructure -----	71
3. Investment and Joint Ventures -----	71
4. Regional Development Assistance -----	72
5. Monetary Linkages -----	72
6. Industrial Integration -----	73
E. MILITARY ISSUES -----	74
1. Defense Problems -----	74
2. Defense Resolutions -----	75
F. FOREIGN RELATIONS -----	76
G. RELIGIOUS ISSUES -----	86
H. COUNTER GCC MOVEMENTS -----	87
1. Aden Alliance -----	87
2. Shiite-Marxist Coalition -----	88
I. OPINION -----	89
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV -----	90
V. WESTERN ALLIED INVOLVEMENT IN GULF DEFENSE -----	94
A. JOINT ARMS SUPPLY -----	94
B. FRANCE -----	97

C. UNITED KINGDOM -----	99
D. OTHER WESTERN ALLIES -----	103
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V -----	106
VI. CONCLUSION -----	108
APPENDIX A - THE ARMED FORCES OF OMAN -----	114
APPENDIX B - THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CONSTITUTION ----	115
APPENDIX C - THE PROVISIONS OF THE ADEN PACT -----	118
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	120
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	123

I. INTRODUCTION

The current misguided U.S. Persian Gulf policy is hung on the facade of strategic consensus, a thematic policy that is primarily aimed at curtailing Soviet expansionism and ambitions in the Middle East and the Gulf. According to some, strategic consensus is both foolhardy and ephemeral and a policy that stems from rhetoric and a global viewpoint.¹ A Gulf policy based on strategic consensus tends to treat the area as an arena for superpower competition and confrontation and ignores the regional actors and their perceptions of Gulf security. Contrary to being a viable solution to security problems in the Persian Gulf, reliance on a strategic consensus based policy could exacerbate regional conflicts and stimulate upheaval in the area.

This thesis is written in two parts. First it examines the Persian Gulf from a geostrategic and historical perspective emphasizing Oman, its history of internal and external challenges to the Sultanate, and its history of external support provided chiefly by the United Kingdom and the United States. It then offers an opinion that the current Oman-U.S. relationship (which plays the strategic consensus card) is not the best course for the U.S. to take to ensure the security of the Gulf (and its oil).

Secondly, the thesis presents two alternative routes toward Gulf security by examining the Gulf Cooperation Council, its collective defense plans, foreign relations, and contemporary

problems; and several Western Alliance options for involvement in Gulf affairs. An attempt is made throughout to emphasize not a strategic consensus type policy but rather a regionally based policy with little direct U.S. participation.

Finally, the thesis seeks to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the various programs for Gulf security and to offer an opinion as to which would be the best for the region and the U.S.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹Amos Perlmutter, "Reagan's Middle East Policy: A Year-One Assessment," Orbis, Spring 1982, p. 29. See also opinions on strategic consensus by Landrum R. Bolling, Adam M. Garfindle, Michael C. Hudson, and Daniel Pipes in same issue of Orbis, pp. 5-29.

II. THE GULF

From time immemorial the Gulf region - under various names - has been an area of utmost strategic importance whose value has increased even more so with the discovery of oil. In 1951, President Eisenhower described the Persian Gulf as the most strategically important area in the world and some thirty-one years, two oil embargoes, a major revolution, and an ongoing war later, there cannot be a more apt description of this most volatile and turbulent area.¹ The Iranian revolution, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Mecca mosque incident, the Iran-Iraq war, and the coup attempt in Bahrain have underscored the vulnerability of the conservative Gulf regimes and thus of the West to a range of potential external and regional threats. The problem of the 1980's, therefore, is to find the best way to ensure the security of the conservative Gulf regimes and the flow of oil to the West.

Prior to any attempt to analyze and to offer solutions to the contemporary problems confronting the Gulf states, it is necessary to become familiar with some geostrategic facts and history associated with the Gulf. This chapter portends to accomplish just that.

A. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS

The Gulf is surrounded, at the north by Iraq, at the west by the Arabian Peninsula, at the east by Iran, and at the south by the Strait of Hormuz. Extending from the Gulf of Oman to the marshes of

the Shatt al-Arab it is 600 miles long with its widest point being 230 miles. With no discernible channel, the Gulf is shaped like a flat, shallow basin never exceeding 300 feet in depth.² The shores of the Gulf are generally inhospitable, swampy in the north and desert elsewhere, occasionally broken by salt flats. The climate of the Gulf is harsh and generally arid. The summer (May-October) temperature averages over 115 degrees Fahrenheit and David Long reported, in his study of the Gulf, a 145 degree thermometer reading.³ Contrary to the ideas of many Westerners, however, the climate is not always hot and dry. Along the coast, the summer months are very muggy and the humidity sometimes stays at 100 percent for days. Alternatively, in the winter months, temperatures drop very rapidly, and it is not uncommon for them to dip below freezing.⁴

B. NOMENCLATURE

One of the very first problems witnessed by the Gulf region was that of its name. The Gulf began as the Lower Sea in the third millenium B.C. and is now called either the Persian Gulf, Arabian Gulf (sometimes the Islamic Gulf), or just the Gulf. In fact, the Gulf has been called many other names by the Babylonians, the Greeks, and the first inhabitants and navigators.⁵ For the last two centuries or so the term "Persian Gulf" has been in universal use and it was not until the 1960's that the Arabs adopted the expression al-Khalij al-Arabi. Throughout this thesis the terms Persian Gulf, Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf will be used interchangeably and it is up to the reader to chose his preference.

C. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf has come from its usefulness as a passageway between Europe and Asia. It has remained throughout the ages a heavily navigated trade route between Europe, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. It has maintained this character even after World War II and the development of aviation and air transport. Of more contemporary importance, the Gulf is situated in a sedimentary basin which holds roughly two-thirds of the world's proven reserves of oil. The growing importance of Persian Gulf oil is illustrated by its increasing percentage of total world oil output. In 1976, the oil-producing states bordering the Persian Gulf accounted for 37 percent of world output. This compares with 27 percent of world output derived from the Gulf in 1966, 24 percent in 1961, 19 percent in 1956, and 15 percent in 1951. In a period of expanding energy demand, the Persian Gulf producers would appear to be in a strong position for some time into the immediate future.⁶

It may be significant to note that Western Europe has far more at stake in the Persian Gulf than the U.S. It relies on Gulf oil for almost two-thirds of its total oil consumption.⁷ France clearly has the most at stake: almost three-fourths of its oil comes from Persian Gulf imports, a dramatic increase from 15 years ago when half its oil came from the region. As a primary energy source, imported Gulf oil has become increasingly important to France, up from about one-fifth of all energy consumed in 1965 to over half of it by 1978. France is almost as dependent on the Gulf for its energy as is Japan, which relies on the Gulf for 80 percent of its

oil and 60 percent of its energy.⁸ Thus, it is ironic that the U.S., not Western Europe or Japan, now bears the mantle of protecting Western security interests in the Gulf. (Increased Allied participation in Gulf defense will be covered in Chapter V.)

D. HISTORICAL FACTS

1. Extra-regional Actors

The history of the Arabian Gulf and its region is fraught with problems, conflicts, and wars and it may be said that the problems it is facing today stem from events that took place towards the end of the last century and the beginning of the twentieth century. One will recall that the early years of this century witnessed a revival of European competition over the Gulf. The Russians, the French, and the Germans began to look at the Gulf in the same way as the Portuguese and the Dutch had looked at it before (East-West trade). Britain, which had in the meantime established interests in the region, sought, on the other hand, to oppose the other European states' ambitions and to protect its own interests and positions in the region. The Russian-British conflict ended in 1907 with the signing of an agreement which split Iran into two zones of influence, the north for Russia and the south for Britain. The British also succeeded in preventing the Germans from establishing a port in the Gulf and in barring the French from the region. By the end of World War I, the Gulf was virtually made a British preserve by treaties with Kuwait and Qatar, influence in Iran, and mandate control in Iraq.⁹

The Second World War marked the end of exclusive British presence in the Gulf for various reasons, including the aftermath of the war, the weakening of Britain as an imperialist and colonial power, and the rise of the U.S. which progressively replaced Britain as the dominating Western power in the Gulf region, both politically and economically. The British Labor Government's decision in 1968 to terminate a century and a half of hegemony by withdrawing all British forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 marked a watershed in U.S. relations with the Gulf states. Since the British withdrawal and the 1973 oil embargo, the U.S. has pursued a fairly well-defined policy in the Persian Gulf. First there was President Nixon's "region of peace" policy in 1973,¹⁰ and then there was the "twin pillar policy" with Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's encouragement of regional cooperation efforts and reliance on the two key countries of Saudi Arabia and Iran in 1975.¹¹ Simply put, until the Carter era and strategic consensus was ushered in, the U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf post-British withdrawal consisted of dependence on regional cooperation and a very limited U.S. presence in the area. It is the contention of this thesis that the U.S. should reevaluate current policies and lean more toward the regional cooperation and other policies which have come before.

2. Local Actors

The preceding capsulized history was concerned with the important extra-regional actors, now a look at the local actors is apropos. One of the more important actors in the region, and the one who dominates today's press, is Iran, especially since the fall

of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979 and the attendant rise of Khomeini. Iran's rulers will always try to extend Iran's military power over the Gulf, which is one of the central tenets of Iranian security policy. The British military withdrawal from the Gulf left Iran as the strongest local power; a position the Shah tried to maintain with U.S. help. The Arab states of the Gulf were comfortable when Iran played the role of Gulf policeman; however, today the roles have changed. Now the Arab states have to police the Gulf themselves and the Iranians have become a nemesis.

The Iran-Iraq war has precipitated several events, the most significant being the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (which is discussed at length in Chapter IV). Occasionally, these two Gulf states, which are the most likely to present a direct military challenge to or to work subversion on the Arab side of the Gulf, are preoccupied with the war. Nonetheless, the Gulf war will continue to be a major source of tension and instability in the Persian Gulf region for the indefinite future. While holding both countries in a hostage-like grip in the coming years, the conflict has the potential to erupt repeatedly into full-scale hostilities and to expand to neighboring states, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The persistence of Iranian-Iraqi tension will enhance and strengthen the role of Saudi Arabia in the political, military, and security affairs of the Gulf (already evidenced by the Saudi role in the GCC). The continuation of the conflict, however, is not the only factor influencing this development, because there is Peninsula-wide concern about Iran's oft-stated goals of exporting its revolution.

Turning to the other Arab Gulf states, they have essentially similar regimes and face similar problems stemming mainly from their oil wealth and rapid development. The people of these countries share elements of a common heritage. Perhaps the single most important such element is Islam. Although all Arab Gulf States adhere to the Islamic faith, and all are ruled by Sunni Muslims (save for Oman), their individual perceptions of the role of Islam in the affairs of state vary significantly.

Generally the impact of Islam on interstate relations has been both positive and negative. The conservative interpretation of Islam by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, has brought them closer together, but has created serious conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iraq (principally because of Iraq's secularity and relations with the Soviet Union). The Shia-Sunni division within Islam itself has also affected relations among Arab Gulf states. This factor plays even a more significant role since the establishment of a Shiite Islamic Republic in Iran. Religious differences in the Gulf do not have the direct political implications that, for example, they do in Northern Ireland. But in the Gulf, allegiance to a particular religious group is a major determinant of one's identity, which is the basic building block upon which loyalty to the state is constructed.¹²

All of the Arab Gulf states are ruled by authoritarian regimes, which are solidly based on tribalism as expressed in family-centered rule. As with Islam, tribalism has both positive and negative effects. The tribal origin of the Arab Gulf regimes has had a positive impact on their relations with each other. With a

common interest in preserving family rule, they have been able to conduct friendly relations with each other and to settle some disputes. Alternatively, the tribal nature of these states has made them suspicious of the "secular" political ideology of Iraq.

The states of the Persian Gulf possess a similar cultural heritage in terms of social origin and religious affiliation but their actual populations are often very dissimilar. Except for Iraq, the Arab Gulf states have small indigenous populations, with correspondingly large nonindigenous minorities. They have had to rely on hundreds of thousands of foreign workers. The political fallout of these demographic facts cannot be overstated and will be covered in more depth later (see Chapter IV Economic Issues). In short, the Gulf states show commonality in environment, religion, demography, and ideology but they are not without their problems.

E. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

The division of the Gulf region is considered by many Arab historians as a direct result of British policy in the region which was divided into several emirates and sheikhdoms whose political borders "have nothing in common with any other borders in the world."¹³ Territorial disputes have long been a basic political fact of life in the Gulf. Not only are there few permanent features in the desert terrain characteristic enough to permit a definitely described boundary line, but also the need for boundary lines did not exist in the region until the development of oil resources. Some of the more noteworthy territorial disputes are as follows:

- Buraimi Oasis; Saudi Arabia, Oman and Abu Dhabi
- Shatt al-Arab; Iran and Iraq
- Iraqi claim to Kuwait and some Kuwaiti islands
- Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands; Iran and the UAE
- Iranian claim to Bahrain
- Bahraini claim to northern Qatar
- Gulf median line; between Arab and Persian side of Gulf

Although some disputes have been resolved by patient negotiations, there are still several cases where serious conflict could occur and territorial uncertainties remains one of the thorniest issues that the Gulf states are still facing.¹⁴

Another problem for some of the Gulf states is the exhaustion of oil, which provides their only source of revenue. The fact that reserves will not last have made these states (Oman for one) aware first, of the need for getting themselves the benefits brought by these riches, and second, to develop alternative sources of revenue for the time when all reserves will have dried up. Depending on oil as the sole source of revenues is now seen as posing immediate political problems in an area whose prosperity has been based solely on the production and exportation of oil.

One cannot discuss Arab interstatal relations without some mention of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has affected the Gulf states for many years, especially since the 1973 war and embargo. As a general rule, the impact of this issue has been positive and the differences which have frequently appeared have not been permitted by the states concerned to destroy their relations. For

example, Oman was the only Gulf state not to go along with the ostracization of Egypt after Camp David, yet it was not excluded from membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As the situation stands today, Oman may be an important catalyst aiding the return of Egypt to the Arab fold. Egypt could then become an important supplier of manpower and equipment for the defense of the Gulf states, and, therefore, an important asset to the GCC.

Probably the most important and influential issue confronting the Arab Gulf states today is the question of Gulf security and the regional role of the superpowers. As already mentioned, the problem of Gulf security has been a recurrent theme ever since Britain withdrew its forces from Aden in the early seventies. Gulf security is the underlying theme of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The foregoing broad brush treatment of the Gulf and its problems will be distilled down to some specifics including a closer look at Oman, the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council, and the possibility of a greater Western Allied participation in Gulf security.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., The Security of the Persian Gulf, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), intro.

²David E. Long, The Persian Gulf, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 1.

³Ibid., p. 3.

⁴For a country by country study of climate see Appendix B of Alvin J. Cottrell, ed., The Persian Gulf States, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 543.

⁵An excellent historical tracing of Gulf nomenclature is found in Edmund C. Bosworth, "The Nomenclature of the Persian Gulf," in The Persian Gulf States edited by Alvin J. Cottrell.

⁶Keith McLachan, "Oil in the Persian Gulf Area," in The Persian Gulf States, edited by Alvin J. Cottrell, p. 215.

⁷Benjamin F. Schemmer, "NATO's Challenge in the Persian Gulf and Middle East," Armed Forces Journal International, Nov. 1981, p. 36.

⁸Ibid.

⁹David E. Long, p. 69.

¹⁰Bard E. O'Neill, Petroleum and Security: The Limitations of Military Power in the Persian Gulf, National Security Affairs Monograph 77-4, Oct. 1977, (Washington: National Defense University Research Directorate), p. 2.

¹¹U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, The Persian Gulf 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 3.

¹²David E. Long, p. 7.

¹³Arab World Weekly, 27 October 1979, p. 17.

¹⁴For more information on boundaries see R. Michael Burrell and Keith McLachan, "The Political Geography of the Persian Gulf," in The Persian Gulf States, pp. 121-128; David E. Long, pp. 47-53; and Richard F. Nyrop et al Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, (Washington: American University, 1977), pp. 25-34.

III. OMAN

A. HISTORICAL SETTING

1. Background

The historical heritage of Oman is most important in understanding the present day policies of Muscat. Apart from the Saudi pride in its history as the home of the prophet, no other Gulf country has for so long been so obsessed with dreams of returning to its former greatness. Oman is one of the oldest political entities of the Arabian Peninsula, unique in having kept its independence during most of its history. Its strategic geographic location made it the meeting place of many cultures, and this shaped its history accordingly.

Oman has been inhabited since the end of the latest Ice Age, about 12,000 B.C. The first inhabitants, who were to introduce copper to the world in the fourth millenium B.C., are believed to have been Sumerian. They gave the name Magan to the area at the entrance of the Gulf. The Sumerians were followed by the Chaldeans, and then by Oman bin Qahtan bin Hud, who ruled the country and gave it his name.¹ Assyrians, Babylonians, Sabeans and Persians came and went in turn. Early Oman boasted a flourishing civilization which was part of the great civilization that spanned Persia and beyond into Afghanistan in the third millenium B.C.

Oman's coasts, then as now, lie on one of the world's most important sea routes. Omani maritime activity dates back to the

third millenium B.C. and in fact the first record of long distance sea trade in the history of the world is of the trips taken by the Magan boats which sailed to Ur laden with copper and other goods. Thousands of Omani plied the Indian Ocean in their distinctive craft and, centuries later, an Omani seaman was among those who discovered the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope.² By the end of the first millenium B.C., Oman's most important commercial activity was the production and export of frankincense from Dhofar, a product much in demand in the ancient world.

Oman's recorded history began with the advent of the Arabs in the second century B.C., when two Arab tribes, the Yemeni and the Nizari, migrated to Oman. Several other tribes followed after the collapse of the Ma'rib Dam in 120 A.D. One of the first tribes of that time was Al-Azad, from whom Oman's ruling family today is descended.

In the sixth century, Omani tribesmen embraced Islam and in fact sent a delegation to Medina subsequent to the Prophet Mohammad's death in 632 A.D.³ Within the first centruy of the coming of Islam, the Ibadi movement, which evolved in Basra, had won many converts in Oman. The Ibadis taught that a man's good works proved his inner worth. They believed in electing the most suitable leader--imam--if one were available, whether or not he was from the Prophet's family. Imams were given both spiritual and temporal authority.

After the rise of Islam in the seventh century, tribalism and religion in Oman became intimately interconnected. Ibadi

religious ideology and tribalism are traditional forces that stand in the way of political centralization and are so important to the understanding of Oman today that they deserve the following more detailed examinations.

2. Ibadite Islam

The ruling family and an estimated 50 percent of Oman's population belong to the Ibadi sect of Islam. It is an offshoot of the Khariji movement which broke away from the main body of Islam during the reign of the fourth Caliph, Ali, in 658 A.D. The Kharijis were noted for their extreme fanaticism and were fundamentalists who believed that no other guides to spiritual, social, and political life were needed except the Quran and the life of the Prophet.⁴ After breaking with Ali, they became fragmented into a number of sects, of which one of the more moderate, the followers of Ibad (named after Abdullah bin Ibad), migrated from Iraq to Oman in the eighth century to escape persecution by the Sunni Umayyad Caliph. The Ibadis elected their first Imam in 749 A.D.⁵

The Ibadi ideal was to restore Islam to its pristine condition at the time of Mohammad. The Ibadi community can exist in one of several states determined by the religious leadership. A state of "concealment" occurs during periods of persecution, when individual Ibadis are free to practice "dissimulation" to hide their true religion and thus save their lives. In a state of danger a special Imam is appointed to lead the defense of the community. When Ibadis count themselves at least half as strong as their adversaries (in men, arms, supplies, etc.), they may pass into a state of

"manifestation," at which time an Imam can again be elected openly. Ibadism eventually became the official religion of the Omani state.

The Imamate is an institution out of which the contemporary Sultanate grew, and which existed in parallel with the Sultanate at various periods during the last two centuries. Ahmad ibn Said Al Bu Said, the founder of Oman's present ruling dynasty, was elected Imam in 1749 as a result of his success in driving Persian invaders from Oman.⁶ In the face of persistent tribal and religious dissension, the Al Bu Said's eventually dropped all pretensions to the title of Imam and ruled as secular leaders only (Sultans). This opened the way for frequent attempts throughout the 19th and 20th centuries by tribal and religious leaders in Oman's interior to establish an Imamate according to Ibadi principles. In the face of such rebellions (some of which are covered in a later section), the Sultans could generally hold on to the coastal areas, while their power over the mountainous and desert interior waxed and waned. The Imamate is now considered abolished by the Government of Oman, and the office of the Imam has been vacant since 1955.⁷

Today, Oman's various religious establishments and their leaders constitute a large and geographically diffuse interest group. Their political power is limited, however, by the religious heterogeneity of the population. While roughly half of all Omanis, including the ruling family, are Ibadi, the population of Dhofar Province (one-third of Oman's territory), the Musandam Peninsula, Buraimi Oasis, and Oman's Arabian Sea islands (Masirah for one) is Sunni. The Shia population is concentrated in the capital and some coastal areas.⁸

As a final comment on the Ibadis, they are noted for their prayer and piety and resemble the Wahhabis in their tendency to look upon other Muslim sects as religiously lax compared with themselves. The Ibadis are sometimes regarded unjustifiably as puritannical because their mosques are simple and generally devoid of ornament, and because music is not permitted in the Ibadi interior of the country. But they are not an intolerant people and are capable of making common-sense exceptions to their own moral rules. For example, the faithful who live in cold, mountainous regions are given medical dispensation to drink wine.⁹

3. Tribalism

Tribalism has dominated Omani politics since the beginning of the Arab migration into the area 2,000 years ago. Ibadi doctrines regarding the election, status, and functions of the Imam appear to be derived from the older institution of the tribal sheikh. A particularly strong-willed, articulate, and politically astute sheikh could elevate himself to the status of a "paramount sheikh," uniting a number of tribes and clans under his leadership.¹⁰ Like a paramount sheikh, an especially capable Ibadi Imam could unite enough of the interior tribes to threaten the coast. In this regard, an Imam had the special appeal of religion, used as an ideology, to legitimize his claims.

John Duke Anthony sought to identify the major tribes by location in 1975. Clearly, the Al Bu Said was the most important, although at least a dozen tribes were greater numerically.¹¹ The Omani tribes belong to either of two factions: Ghafiri, after

the Bani Ghafir tribe, and Hinawi, after the Bani Hina. The origins of these factions can be traced to the migration of the northern Arab tribes into Oman after the southern tribes had settled there. The Ghafiri-Hinawi split is described as a continuation of this ancient "northern-southern" rivalry. The Bani Hina were known for centuries as Yamanis, or "southern Arabs," whereas the Bani Ghafir were known as "northern Arabs."¹² The Ghafiri-Hinawi rivalry grew out of the civil war which was precipitated by Imamate succession problems in the early 18th century. The conflict escalated from simply a dynastic struggle to a countrywide alignment of inter-tribal forces that divides Omani tribes to this day.¹³ The religious factor compounds the rivalry. Ever since the paramount sheikh of the Bani Ghafir began recruiting Sunni tribes against the Hinawis during their 18th century civil war, the Ghafiri faction has been characterized as Sunni and the Hinawi as Ibadi.¹⁴

There is an interesting aspect of the Ghafiri-Hinawi dichotomy. Tribes with traditional feuds generally chose opposite sides of the division. Since identification with one confederation was not absolute, tribes could and did switch allegiance. As a result of this fluidity in alliances, it required an exceptionally skillful individual to secure the support of tribes from both the Ghafiri and Hinawi factions in order to claim leadership over inner Oman. Moreover, the only key to cooperation between the two confederations lay in the religious appeal; only the symbol of the Imamate could unite the majority of the Omani tribes.¹⁵ The Sultan does not wield the symbolic power (as would an Imam) necessary to maintain tribal

cohesiveness in Oman, and therefore, there exists an undercurrent of tribal strife.

Out of hundreds of tribes or subtribes scattered across Oman, about a dozen besides the Al Bu Said tribe itself have been important to the continuation of the Sultanate. Their significance stems from a combination of factors including size, location, livelihood, character and orientation of leadership, religious affiliation, and identification with one side or the other in the Ghafiri-Hinawi split. The following is a listing of the more salient Omani tribes and their significance:¹⁶

- Bani Ghafir, Bani Umr, and Hawasinah--They are known for their military prowess. They have also been the most fiercely loyal of any tribes to the Sultan. Their members form a substantial number of the askars, a kind of praetorian guard for the ruling family and government posts throughout the country.
- Shihuh and Habus--They inhabit the strategic Musandam Peninsula. Some of these tribesmen have accepted UAE citizenship and have embarrassed the Sultan.
- Duru--They inhabit the Dhahirah region where Oman's oilfields are located. They supported the Sultan during the crucial 1950's (the time of oil exploration) and helped ensure stability during the development of the country's oil industry.
- Janabah--The tribe on Masirah Island.
- Mahrah, Al Kathir, and Qarawi--Dhofari tribes. Mahrah and Al Kathir are historically and culturally oriented toward South Yemen and the Qarawi is the tribe of the Sultan's mother (who has considerable influence within the ruling family).

- Al Hirth--Their paramount sheikh held a powerful position under the previous Sultan and had contracted an engagement between Sultan Qabus and his daughter. After Qabus toppled his father in 1970 he married his first cousin and therefore never honored the Al Hirth tribe engagement. Many among the Hirth resent this failure to honor the contract, which could cause future problems.
- Bani Rujam--The premier Ghafiri tribe in Oman.
- Bani Hina--The namesake of the Hinawi factions and commands the inland approaches to the Omani heartland.

Following the 1970 coup, when Qabus overthrew his father, there was a fundamental shift in political power; the new regime was no longer dependent on the support of tribal figures. The government machinery expanded and key posts were filled by men from merchant families, educated Omanis returning from exile under the old Sultan, and representatives of various other minority groups. Tribal organization and tribal confederations were no longer a major factor in Omani national politics. Although one or two ministerial positions were reserved for representatives of interior tribes, the majority of the sheikhs were bypassed. According to John Peterson, tribalism as a factor in the political life of Oman is declining in importance.¹⁷ Only the ruling family continues to play an important, central political role, and could represent an important bridge between the ancient tribal society and the modern state. One must remember, however, the tribal structure of Oman will never disappear.

4. Ruling Family

Sultan Qabus is the 14th successor to a dynasty which began in 1749 and was punctuated with civil war, corruption, various stages of internal geographic division, intrigue, treason, and political assassination. The prominent personalities of the current Al Bu Said family are as follows:¹⁸

- Qabus ibn Said Al Bu Said; Sultan, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Finance.
- Badr ibn Suud Al Bu Said; Minister of Interior.
- Salim Nasir Al Bu Said; Minister of Communication.
- Fahd ibn Mahmud Al Bu Said; Deputy Prime Minister for Legal Affairs.
- Faisal ibn Ali ibn Faisal Al Bu Said; Minister of National Heritage and Culture.
- Hamad ibn Hamud Al Bu Said; Minister of the Sultan's Affairs.
- Fahr ibn Taimur Al Bu Said; Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Affairs.
- Sayyid Thuwayin ibn Shihab; Governor of Muscat, personal advisor and cousin of Qabus.

In addition to the Al Bu Said listed above, about a dozen local Governors (about one-third of the total) are close and influential relatives of the Sultan. The Sultan has no brothers and as of late-1982 no crown prince nor successor has been named. The Sultan's relatives do not have the political ascendancy enjoyed by many of the royalty of the Arabian Peninsula.¹⁹

Since Sultan Qabus functions as absolute ruler of Oman, and approves all foreign and domestic policies, an examination of

his personal history would be germane. Qabus was born on 18 November 1940. "An intelligent boy, Qabus led a lonely, restricted, and isolated childhood, secluded at the palace in Salalah, permitted neither friends, servants, nor any manner of social intercourse with the exception of that related to his studies."²⁰ His first "escape" from Oman came at sixteen years-old when he was sent to a private English school for Arab princes, Bury St. Edmunds, at York. While there, he became a serious student, expert horseman, and acquired a lifelong taste for classical music (he also loved to drive fast cars).²¹ At twenty-one, he graduated from Sandhurst as a lieutenant in the Cameronians. After an around-the-world trip, he returned to Bury St. Edmunds to study government and economics; he subsequently developed an interest in oil economics. In 1964, he was ordered by his father to return to Salalah supposedly to memorize the Quran and to study the history of the Omani tribes.²² He was kept under virtual house arrest in a four-room residence adjoining the Royal Palace. On 23 July 1970, at the age of 29, Qabus (reportedly with British help) overthrew his father and became Sultan.

Sultan Qabus is one of the most reserved and enigmatic of the Arab rulers, a young and dignified man whose presence seems to evoke impressions of imperial grandeur from the days of the warrior Caliphs. In his perception of Oman's historical importance and destiny, the Sultan brings to mind the Shah of Iran, with whose regime he had close relations. But the resemblance does not go much further; Qabus lacks the Shah's self-righteous severity and, though an absolute ruler, his regime is benevolent and repression is absent.²³

Sultan Qabus is a firm believer in his own and his country's destiny and his objective is no less than the restoration of the country's imperial status in the Arab world, an attitude which inevitably brings him into conflict with other Gulf rulers who have equal dreams but more shaky historical precedents. The Sultan, however, pays little heed to the grumbling of neighbors. Both Omani and foreign advisors pander to his nationalism and only those who encourage the great dream find their way into his courtly entourage.²⁴

Traditionally a lover of things British since his Sandhurst days, Qabus has been moving towards the U.S. as a supporter for his national plans. He prefers the British, but realizes that the days of British power and influence are numbered. He perceives the main threat to Oman as Soviet-directed (either through South Yemen or directly at Gulf oilfields) and is the only Gulf ruler who responded to former U.S. Secretary of State Haig's idea of a "strategic consensus" against the USSR. Britain may have advantages in the quietly efficient way it has run Oman's affairs for the Sultan, but when it comes to a 1980's threat from a superpower, the only viable support in his view can come from another superpower.

Sultan Qabus is popular in Oman. The contrast of life in the capital and in the country compared with ten years ago is still startling enough to remind the population of what he has achieved. Plenty of gaps still remain, however, in terms of rural development and housing for the poor. The Sultan is often criticized for his lavish life-style and palaces and for spending too much time removed from daily affairs in the distant southern Palace at Salalah.²⁵

But Qabus is by no means out of touch with the country. In January 1982, the first meeting of Oman's Consultative Council, which was inaugurated in November of last year, took place. After 12 years of ruling Oman, Sultan Qabus has undertaken a new democratic step which has the objective of having the Omani people exercise some type of control over their own destiny. The decisions of the Council, however, are not binding and are only advisory in nature. Qabus also diligently consults religious leaders on matters of policy. He has cooled his support for Camp David considerably, feeling the internal mood of support for the Palestinians, and has sought a more acceptable regional role for Oman by repairing relations with Saudi Arabia and by becoming a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council.²⁶

B. CHALLENGES TO THE SULTANATE

1. Internal

The history of Oman has consistently been one of division, dichotomies, geographical isolation, and open civil strife. Never close to the Arab states of the Peninsula, Oman's traditional orientation has been toward the subcontinent (differences with Saudi Arabia in the 1950's and 1960's delayed diplomatic relations until the 1970's).²⁷ This isolation was aggravated by Sultan Qabus' friendship with the Shah of Iran, Oman's support for the Camp David peace process, and in identifying openly with Western powers. Today, Oman is vulnerable along a number of fronts. The resuscitation of the Dhofar insurgency by neighboring PDRY (reinforced by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and East Germany) is one possibility. Another is the expansion of the Khomeini revolution and the Gulf war. A third

possibility is a domestic movement, perhaps with military assistance, opposed to the apparent isolation of the Sultan from his people. Oman provides a tempting target for destabilization, both because of its regional "pariah" status and because of its overt pro-Western alignment.

In order to understand the current threats confronting Oman, a look at the more salient past conflicts is appropos. As previously mentioned, Oman is made up of some 200 Arab tribes which had emigrated before and after the advent of Islam (circa 600 A.D.). Additionally, Oman had always remained independent (more or less) of the Islamic Imperial capitals. This independence was expressed primarily through adherence to Ibadhism, a militant brand of Shia Islam. The Ibadhism of the interior tribes of Oman recognized a selected Imam as the sole religious and political authority and resented any control by the Sultan.²⁸

This militarily isolationist character of the interior tribes also served the function of defense against the penetration by European imperial forces. During the heyday of the Omani commercial empire in the 18th century the Al Bu Said dynasty replaced the Yaruba Sultans who had ruled since their recapture of Muscat from the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Bu Said dynasty acquiesced to a division of political and religious power to be exercised by the Sultan and Imam respectively. The coastal economy collapsed in 1860 and a restoration of Imamic rule in Muscat (the interior tribal type rule) was unable to grapple with the economic and social problems.²⁹

In 1871 the British invaded Muscat and restored the Al Bu Said to power. British military intervention was subsequently required in 1877, 1883, around the turn of the century, and during and after the first World War.³⁰ Oman's importance to the British was strategic, not economic, and related to the security of Britain's Indian Empire and secondarily to the control of trade and resources in the Gulf region. In 1920 the British sponsored an agreement between the Sultan and the tribes, the Treaty of Seeb, in which the Sultan in effect granted full autonomy to the tribes in exchange for their promise not to attack the coast. This de facto partition kept the country as pacific as the British required until the mid-1950's, when the search for new oil reserves in the interior led to conflict.

2. Oil-precipitated Conflicts

In 1952, after the possibility of large oil reserves in the Buraimi Oasis were confirmed, Saudi Arabia exercised its claim to the disputed territory by sending troops (armed by ARAMCO) to occupy it.³¹ Britain protested and led the Sultan's army to re-occupy the oasis in 1955. The U.S., backing Saudi Arabia, righteously denounced "British aggression" but otherwise let the matter rest. The Saudis had no choice but to do the same.³²

A more serious conflict had erupted in Oman in 1954. Protests from the Imam over alleged oil-prospecting team violations of the Treaty of Seeb prompted the British to make a show of force. In late 1955 the British occupied three towns, centers of Islamic strength. Meanwhile, the Imam's brother maneuvered to get Saudi (and ARAMCO) arms and backing and to raise a force of Omani exiles

which were fashioned into an Oman Liberation Army. They formalized their cause with demands for an independent Omani interior and the withdrawal of all Muscati and British troops to the coast. They received diplomatic backing from the Arab League and even from the Soviet Bloc. Arms and men were smuggled up from the coast, and a coordinated tribal uprising was planned.

In the Spring and Summer of 1957 the Omani interior rose up against the occupation forces. This precipitated the 1958 visit of Julian Amery, the British Minister of Defense, to discuss further strategy and to establish the new Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF). What the Amery agreement did was to provide for equipment and running costs, and a framework from which serving British Officers could be seconded to the SAF.³³ Meanwhile, the rebels were acquiring American-made mines and mortars from Saudi Arabia and using them to harass and ambush British forces. By the end of January 1959, the British had finally suppressed the rebellion. Saudi Arabia continued to support the Imam (vice the Sultan) until 1962 when events in Yemen demanded an end to this inter-imperialist squabble between Saudi Arabia (backed by the U.S.) and Britain.

3. Dhofar Rebellion

The military coup against the Imamic regime in Yemen in September 1962 was the most important political event to occur in Arabia in modern times. It provided political and military sanctuary for launching an armed struggle a year later against the British occupation in Aden and the Protectorates; a struggle which eventually produced the first regime in the Arab world committed to

a Marxist-Leninist path to development. In 1964 the contagion of liberation reached eastward to Dhofar where on 9 June 1965, a guerrilla war began against the Sultan of Oman under the banner of Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF).

Dhofar came under Omani rule near the end of the 19th century, after at least several centuries of existence as an autonomous fiefdom. With the support of the British, Omani rule was established in 1879, but only on the coastal plain. Dhofar was never integrated into the Sultanate of Oman but regarded formally as a dependency and subjected to the crudest kind of Sultanic plunder. Said bin Taimur, the Sultan from 1932 to 1970, exercised a greater degree of control over Dhofar. He married a Dhofari woman by whom he had one son, the current Sultan Qabus. After 1958, Sultan Taimur moved his residence from Muscat to Salalah, from where he could directly supervise the exploitation of Dhofar at an intensity greater than that imposed on Oman proper. Here lie the roots of the Dhofari rationale for its anti-Sultanic revolt.

The profound political transformation of Arab national liberation movements after the June war and the NLF seizure of state power in South Yemen in 1967 was manifested in the second DLF congress in 1968. It was at this meeting that the name of the organization was changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), a decision that reflected an unequivocal shift to an ideology committed to scientific socialism and the adoption of a comprehensive revolutionary strategy. This radicalization was supported by the outrageous policies of reprisal and punishment

devised by Sultan Taimur to crush the struggle. The coastal towns were encircled with barbed wire. Dhofaris were banned from travel or service in the army. An economic blockade designed to starve out guerrillas inflicted dire hardships on most of the Dhofari population and helped to build the ranks of the popular front.

By 1970 Sultan Taimur's government had come to be regarded as the most reactionary and isolationist in the area, if not the world; slavery was still common (note that this is in 1970) and many medieval prohibitions were still in force. The Sultan's refusal to use oil revenues (first exports began in 1967)³⁴ for any purpose other than the building up of his armed forces had particularly embarrassed the British, the oil companies, and the neighboring states, and this attitude provided ideal conditions for the Dhofar rebellion. In July 1970 when Qabus deposed his father, he announced his intention to transform the country by using the oil revenues and asked the rebels for help in developing the country; the rebel response was minimal and they appeared to think that the palace coup had changed little.

The progress achieved since the coup did have some impact on the insurgents' following, with a number of defections to the Sultan's forces, but fighting continued. In 1972, SAF forces attacked the PDRY border area and in 1973 Iranian troops came to the aid of the Sultan who was also receiving assistance from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Pakistan, and India. In late 1975 the Sultan claimed complete victory over the insurgents and on 11 March 1976 a cease fire between Oman and the PDRY was negotiated by Saudi Arabia. In 1978 a

renewal of the insurrection occurred with reports of increasing support for the PFLO (name changed from PFLOAG in 1974). The PFLO, however, has become largely an external force and has achieved little success in attracting adherents within Oman, although the Governor of Dhofar was assassinated in 1979 and renewed insurgency was reported. In January 1981 Oman closed the border with the PDRY to discourage a renewal of insurgency.

Oman's relations with the PDRY are still very much strained. Oman insists that South Yemen must stop interfering in Oman's internal affairs and in particular end its support for the PFLO guerrillas. Alternatively, Aden has laid down three conditions for normal relations with Oman. First, foreign (i.e. American) bases in Oman must be closed down; second, Oman must end "provocative maneuvers" along the frontier; and third, it must "return to the Arab fold," renounce Camp David, and end collaboration with Egypt.³⁵ Currently, Oman enjoys strong support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.S. and it is hard to see how any lasting reconciliation with Aden can be achieved.

Oman's threat perceptions, both internal and external, necessitate the maintenance of an armed force and external arms assistance. Additionally, the need to be armed stems not only from the perceived threats to the Sultanate, but also from the basic psyche of the Arab. Throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and certainly in Oman, it has been regarded for generations as essential for a man to be armed; a man who does not carry a weapon, in Oman a rifle and a dagger, is not a man. His virility is in question.

Although this attitude is beginning to change as popular education spreads, it still remains a most powerful influence. A boy at puberty is circumcised and given a rifle; both acts are important badges of his manhood.

Thus, a strong tribe is a well-armed tribe, the respect by which it is held by other tribes being in direct proportion to the number of armed men it can parade.³⁶ Taken to the next stage, a nation, as an amalgam of tribes, will only be respected in the world if it is seen to be militarily strong. Arming with sophisticated weaponry is not done to counter any specific threat but in many cases just to be armed. Just as an unarmed man is not a man, an unarmed nation is not a nation.

Oman suffers doubly from this international game of keeping up appearances because the country could be said to be situated in a street with rich neighbors. Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq are all near to or bordering Oman and are all profligate spenders on modern arms and advanced weapons systems (one need only mention AWACs). Oman has to be seen, at least in some Omani eyes, to be holding up its head in such a neighborhood.

Per capita military spending in the Middle East is the world's highest and Oman is right up there at number six with \$1,060 (behind Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Israel). The world's next highest per capita military spenders, the U.S. and Libya, each spend about \$600.³⁷ Oman spends 18 times more on its military than on education and 15 times more than on health.³⁸ Because of an extremely poor indigenous defense manufacturing

capability, Oman relies almost exclusively on foreign sources to fulfill its arms requirements.

C. SUPPORT FOR THE SULTANATE

1. United Kingdom

Oman became the first British protectorate in the region and is now the last bastion of British influence. As far back as 1798, under the shadow of the French advance during the Napoleonic wars, the British coerced the coastal tribes of Oman to sign a series of treaties which gave Britain exclusive rights to control their foreign affairs and defense.³⁹ On a number of occasions the Oman tribes rose against British rule (the first was in 1895); in 1960 the UN General Assembly passed resolutions urging Britain to recognize the independence of Oman and withdraw her forces.

A watershed for the British in the area was its withdrawal from east of the Suez in 1968.⁴⁰ This is the date both when the arms race in the Gulf began and when the U.S. was forced to re-evaluate its regional policy, which was predicated on a British political and military presence. In the years immediately following the announcement of British troop withdrawals, there was a mad scramble among affected Mideast countries to build up their own armed forces to fill the military vacuum certain to ensue. These countries, especially Oman, being familiar with British arms and military doctrine, quite naturally made Britain the main beneficiary of their petrodollars. In the months following the withdrawal announcements, arms sales, complete with advisors, were announced with Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Oman.⁴¹

Two different sources list the following monetary amounts for past arms imports to Oman: \$67 million (\$21 million British) between 1967 and 1975⁴² and \$114 million (\$60 million British) between 1973 and 1977.⁴³ Although the U.S. (which will be discussed in the next section), France, Italy, Canada, Jordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have supplied arms to Oman, its most sophisticated weapons have been supplied by the United Kingdom. In fact, 1974 was a banner year for Omani ordering of British arms as the following list indicates.

Jaguar aircraft-----	12
Strikemaster aircraft-----	4
Assorted transport aircraft-----	18
Fast patrol boats-----	4
Rapier air defense system-----	1
Blindfire radar system-----	1
Saladin armored-cars-----	40
105mm guns-----	36

Deliveries of the above listed systems were completed in 1977.⁴⁵ Since 1977, additional contracts have been reported including ones for a support ship, a fast-attack missile craft, two Province-class fast patrol boats, 12 more Jaguars, and 30 Chieftain tanks.⁴⁶ (See Appendix A for Oman's current Order of Battle)

There are several rationales behind British arms sales to Oman (and other Gulf states), one of which is simply related to the economics of the exports. Another is related to continuing British political interests in its ex colonies (although Oman was not a colony de jure, it was de facto). Arms sales to Oman, complete with advisors, is a way of maintaining ties and influence for the British. Additionally, the UK does not really have to push or hard sell its equipment, rather Oman desires British equipment because

the Omani armed forces have had previous experience with it. Another factor is the large presence (800+) of British seconded troops in Oman.⁴⁷ One must also remember that Sultan Qabus is a graduate of the British Military school at Sandhurst and his relations with the British are excellent.

It is common to describe the history of the British connection with the Gulf in terms of the assertion and maintenance of British predominance in response to a recognition of the strategic importance of the area. The defense of India, the defense of the routes to the east, and the defense of economic interest each played some part in the molding of the British policy. British predominance was primarily the consequence of a need for someone to keep the peace and the failure of the regional powers to do so.⁴⁸ Today, it seems that the U.S. is trying to play a larger role in the area with similar rationales but with the additional goal of seeking base rights. The British were, by and large, successful; but will the U.S. be successful or simply exacerbate an already touchy situation?

2. United States

Direct U.S. interests in the Gulf originated in Oman in the 1820's. At that time the Sultanate was a leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean. Muscat was one of the great ports of the Indian Ocean, and Zanzibar, a dependency of the Sultan, was the center of the slave trade, both East and West.⁴⁹ It only takes a glance at the map of the Middle East to see why Oman is of such strategic importance to the Western world. Located at the southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman shares with Iran the guardianship of

of the Strait of Hormuz. The romantic exaggeration of the strategic importance of the "guardian of the West's jugular" aside, Oman's geography has become more important in the face of both an unfriendly Iran and Soviet power in nearby Afghanistan.

Despite the obvious economic, political, and strategic concerns, the Gulf did not become a specific area of policy interest until 1968 when the British announced their withdrawal plans. Prior to that time, the U.S. had developed close bilateral relations including arms sales and military training with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The U.S. had also maintained a small naval facility at Bahrain since 1949. The first post-1968 U.S. policy for the Gulf was reflected in Joseph Sisco's five principles of 1972 and the now oft referred to "two pillar" policy;⁵⁰ there were no specific provisions for Oman. It is not the intent to provide a blow by blow account of the evolution of U.S. policy in the Gulf, but rather to focus on Oman.

The first significant American link with contemporary Oman was in 1974 when the U.S. Ambassador presented his credentials. Subsequently, to supplement its British hardware, Oman placed its initial order for U.S.-manufactured arms in 1975 (Oman became eligible to order U.S. military equipment in January 1973).⁵¹ Following a visit of Sultan Qabus to Washington in 1975, it was announced that the U.S. would supply Oman with TOW missiles. In return, the U.S. requested permission for "occasional use" of the Omani air base on Masirah Island. The TOW missile sale was seen by many observers as simply the opening wedge towards increased American military sales. In fact, in January 1980, Sultan Qabus reportedly

asked the U.S. for \$800 million worth of military equipment. There are several reports that indicate that the U.S. responded positively to the Omani requests. In February 1980, there were reports that the U.S. and Great Britain had packaged a \$300 million arms deal but that the final agreement was being held back for want of financiers. Saudi Arabia or Kuwait most likely financed this deal and will probably finance future deals.⁵² After all, the U.S. needs bases in the area and Oman is certainly in a key strategic location; it behooves the West to be creative when it comes to packaging future arms deals.

U.S. base rights in Oman, particularly on Masirah Island, have been targetted by U.S. planners since 1973. In September 1973 an Army Colonel paid a three week visit to Oman and reported on the "significant" air strip and necessary support facilities on Masirah. In June 1974, Sultan Qabus informed the British of the U.S. request for "occasional" use of Masirah. The State Department sent a representative to Muscat for discussions. During the 1975 Qabus-Washington visit, the TOW missiles obviously got the U.S. something. The following from the 13 February 1975 Christian Science Monitor is germane:

"According to State Department sources in Washington, the U.S. request to use the British airbase on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman was made by Henry Kissinger to Sultan Qabus when the latter visited Washington in January. These sources assert that the move was initiated by Kissinger himself, and that neither the State Department, the Pentagon, nor the National Security Council had anything to do with it."⁵³

In early 1980 the U.S. announced that Oman had agreed to allow the U.S. military the use of Omani "facilities" in return for

some \$100 million in military aid. For Qabus, the arrangement locks the U.S. into backing his regime, which had previously depended on the Shah of Iran for this service. Even before the British relinquished Masirah in March 1977, the U.S. had been using it for refueling P-3's based on Diego Garcia. Since November 1979, U.S. C-141's have used Masirah to ferry supplies to the carrier task forces in the Arabian Sea area.⁵⁴ In April 1980 Under-Secretary of Defense Robert Komer testified that the U.S. was seeking to upgrade the air bases at Seeb and Thumrayt as well as Masirah, and the ports of Mutrah and Salalah.⁵⁵ Both Thumrayt and Salalah are in Dhofar Province, which was pacified just a few years ago with the assistance of thousands of Iranian troops and U.S.-supplied weapons.

The U.S.-Oman Military Access Agreement was concluded in June 1980 and gives to U.S. military forces access to certain Omani ports and airfields through implementing arrangements as mutually agreed. The exact initial arrangements that have been worked out are not for public record but consist largely of aircraft refuelings, crew rests, and similar activities. The U.S. has agreed to upgrade Omani facilities not only for U.S. purposes but also for Oman's permanent use through a military construction program. The U.S. is "increasing the supply of military equipment in areas where American military equipment appropriately meets the Sultanate's defense needs."⁵⁶ The U.S. also has a planned economic aid program that goes hand in glove with the military agreement. The planned aid program "will assist the process of equitable development in Oman and provide tangible evidence to the Omani population of the

benefits of our broadened relationship.⁵⁷ From the available information on the agreement, there seems to be one very significant clause which the U.S. would certainly like adjusted in the future. It says that no U.S. military units will be stationed in Oman, nor will the U.S. government seek to do so.

U.S. basing in Oman, and especially on Masirah Island, would be invaluable for any U.S. policies in the area. Experts familiar with Masirah's facilities have estimated that the British could have staged 25,000 forces through the island fairly rapidly, if necessary, in meeting their regional commitments. As a staging base, the island offers political as well as security advantages. Sparsely inhabited, there is less of the risk of the kind of local frictions that are so often encountered around mainland facilities. Sultan Qabus himself has said that a firm position must be taken up by the Western powers and this firm position must clearly be supported by adequate "military over-the-horizon power" if deterrence is to be convincing.⁵⁸ In a way, Masirah Island is over the horizon!

The U.S. to date has allocated more than \$164 million to upgrade four naval and air bases in Oman. The Reagan administration will provide \$78.5 million in FY 82 for the upgrading in addition to the \$85.5 million allocated by the Carter administration.⁵⁹ The upgrading includes oil storage and fleet support facilities, a desalinization plant, and improvements in the airfields to accommodate transports, fighters, and surveillance aircraft. In sum, what exists is an agreement whereby the U.S. is supplying arms (up to \$800 million worth), upgrading military

facilities (over \$164 million), and providing economic aid (\$90 million in concessionary loans) for "occasional" use of military facilities. One would think that the U.S. could get much more from such a vocal pro-Western Arab country such as Oman, but why not?

One reason is that American officials, by and large, have very little experience in working closely with the governments of the Arabian Peninsula or, for that matter, other governmental or ethnic groups farther to the east. So far we have done a rather poor job, with press releases which would make Lawrence of Arabia rollover in his grave. Various leaks intended for home consumption in the U.S. have come near to alienating Arab leaders, whose wish is to have a strong but silent partner.⁶⁰

The U.S. intentions toward obtaining base rights in Oman definitely have some positive aspects; a pro-Western oriented government and probably the best strategic location there is to stage from for a large number of Southwestern Asia contingencies. There are some negative aspects, however, which must be taken into account before the U.S. invests more money into Oman only to be denied facilities usage "ala Bandar Abbas or Chah Bahar."

If the U.S. supply of arms to Oman is one of the methods used by the U.S. to ensure regional stability, what do other Arab countries have to say? Using Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) extracts from January to June 1980 (the time frame following the announcement of the U.S.-Omani agreement), the following are some comments offered by some Arab Gulf states.

Bahrain -- Bahrain has asserted that it will never provide any military bases or facilities for any foreign state, "especially the big powers." The Bahraini Foreign Minister emphasized "the defense of the Gulf must be undertaken by the states of the area, and any request by any foreign state for bases or facilities will be rejected."⁶¹ The Foreign Minister added at a later date that

"there is no organization in the Gulf area that supports Oman's steps to grant facilities or military bases in the area. The act of bringing U.S. forces into the area would complicate matters and would render the dangers of conflict and competition between the U.S. and the USSR in the area more possible and more serious."⁶²

Kuwait -- Both the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have rejected the presence of American forces in the area. They express the belief that the region needs no protection because it is capable of protecting itself.⁶³ The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister has called on the major powers to withdraw all their fleets and naval forces from the Gulf region and neighboring areas "and to keep this important strategic region of the world away from international conflicts." He said that Kuwait has repeatedly declared "its disapproval to the inclusion of this region within the arena of world conflicts and has stressed that it is against any military presence in the area."⁶⁴

UAE -- The UAE rejects outside protection and states as such in the following statement:

"It is true that the Arab Gulf states have condemned the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan...however, their position on Afghanistan was decided at the Islamic Conference...and their awareness of the Soviet danger does not mean that they should accept foreign forces. Just as they reject and condemn any Soviet expansion, the Gulf States, on the basis of the same independent national will, reject U.S. protection."⁶⁵

Saudi Arabia -- "The Saudi Information Minister has stressed that there are no foreign military bases and that there never will be any foreign military bases in Saudi Arabia. He asserted that his country does not believe in pacts and blocs."⁶⁶ The Saudis are understood to be insisting that American efforts in Oman be limited and discrete in order to avoid offending the majority of Arab countries which object to an American military presence in the Arab world as long as the U.S. continues to support Israel. Saudi views are respected in Muscat as Saudi economic assistance is vital to Oman.⁶⁷ It is taken for granted that Saudi Arabia will pay for much of the projected American and other Western military assistance to Oman.

Iraq -- But it is Iraq which is most strongly pursuing positive non-alignment. It condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but was equally as scathing about U.S. attempts to make political capital out of the situation, and has called for an Arab Charter banning the use of force in inter-Arab disputes and forbidding the establishment of foreign bases on Arab soil.⁶⁸ The first article of the proposed charter states:

"The presence in the Arab homeland of any foreign troops or military forces shall be rejected and no facilities for the use of Arab territory shall be extended to them in any form or under any pretext or cover. Any Arab regime that fails to comply with this principle shall be proscribed and boycotted both economically and politically as well as politically opposed by all available means."⁶⁹

Of course Libya could not pass up an opportunity for anti-U.S. rhetoric and, immediately after the U.S.-Omani agreement was finalized in June 1980, it was bitterly condemned by the Arab People's Congress as being a concession to "U.S. imperialism."

In addition to these negative reactions to Omani-U.S. cooperation from external players, the PFLO also had some things to say. When word of a U.S.-Omani agreement reached the Voice of the PFLO in Aden, it broadcast, "The opening by Qabus' Muscat regime of Oman's doors to these foreigners, the enemies of the people, so that they might establish military bases on the soil of our country constitutes a grave threat to the freedom not only of our Omani people, but of all the peoples of the region."⁷⁰

In light of the above negative view on U.S. arms for base rights in Oman, should the U.S. be pushing this method for regional security? I say no; but what are the alternatives? I think there are two main alternative methods for Gulf security which the U.S. should support; one is to support a regional defense organization and the other is to advocate more Allied participation in arms supply and the Western presence. The next two chapters focus on these two alternative routes to Gulf security.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹ Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information and Youth Affairs, Facts and Figures - History, 1981. Donald Hawley, however, offers alternatives for the derivation of the name see Donald Hawley, "Some Surprising Aspects of Omani History," Asian Affairs XIII Part I (February 1982) 28-39.

² Ibid.

³ John Whelan, ed. Oman: A MEED Practical Guide, London: Middle East Economic Digest, 1981, p. 9.

⁴ H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 82.

⁵ James E. Dougherty, "Religion and Law," in The Persian Gulf States, edited by Alvin J. Cottrell, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 306.

⁶ John E. Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century, (London: Croon Helm Ltd., 1978), p. 26.

⁷ Defense Intelligence Agency, Tribes and Religion in the Arabian Peninsula, Defense Intelligence Analytical Memorandum DDE-2500-1-79, December 1979, p. 24.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ James E. Dougherty, p. 307.

¹⁰ For an explanation of what constitutes an Omani tribe or clan see John Townsend, Oman, (London: Croon Helm Ltd., 1977), pp. 51-4.

¹¹ Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, (Washington: American University, 1977), p. 353.

¹² DIA, Tribes and Religion, p. 25.

¹³ John E. Peterson, p. 112.

¹⁴ DIA, Tribes and Religion, p. 26.

¹⁵ J. E. Peterson, "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia," "Middle East Journal" (Summer 1977), p. 305.

¹⁶Tribal information condensed from J. E. Peterson and Defense Intelligence Agency Memorandum.

¹⁷J. E. Peterson, "Tribes and Politics," p. 311-312.

¹⁸DIA, Tribes and Religion, p. 28.

¹⁹Richard F. Nyrop et al, p. 352.

²⁰Thomas K. Weiss, "Dhofar: The Faceless Leader," Paper presented at the 23rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 24-27, 1982, p. 42.

²¹Current Biography 1978, "Qabus bin Said," p. 337.

²²J. B. Kelly, Arabia, The Gulf, and the West, (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 142.

²³Arab Press Service, "The Fate of the Arabian Peninsula," Vol. 2, No. 1, (July 1981), p. 1.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 3.

²⁶For more information on the Gulf Cooperation Council, see Chapter IV.

²⁷William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 101.

²⁸Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, (London: Penguin, 1974), p. 267.

²⁹Ibid., p. 270.

³⁰"The Struggle for Liberation in Oman," Middle East Research and Information Project (April 1975), p. 10.

³¹Fred Halliday, p. 281.

³²"The Struggle for Liberation in Oman," p. 12.

³³Ian Skeet, Muscat and Oman: The End of an Era, (London) 1974, p. 173. Quoted in "The Struggle for Liberation in Oman," p. 12.

³⁴Richard Nyrop et al, p. 368.

³⁵Fred Halliday, "Aden and Muscat Still Far Apart," The Middle East (July 1982), p. 13.

³⁶John Townsend, p. 147.

³⁷Frank Barnaby, "Middle East Arms and Militarization," Middle East Review 1981, Edited by Graham Hancock, (Essex: World of Information, 1980), p. 24.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean Towards a Peace Zone, (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), p. 96.

⁴⁰Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1975, (New York: Crane, Russak and Co. Inc., 1975), p. 198.

⁴¹Fred Halliday, p. 24.

⁴²SIPRI Yearbook 1975, p. 200.

⁴³Foreign Military Markets Middle East/Africa, (Greenwich: Defense Market Service, 1980), p. 1.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Richard Nyrop et al, p. 401.

⁴⁶SIPRI Yearbook 1980 and International Defense Newsletter #12, (Greenwich: Defense Market Service, 23 March 1981, 23 February 1981, and 20 April 1981).

⁴⁷Alvin J. Cottrell, Robert J. Hanks, and Frank T. Bray, "Military Affairs in the Persian Gulf," in The Persian Gulf States, edited by Alvin J. Cottrell, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 161.

⁴⁸Malcolm Yapp, "British Policy in the Persian Gulf," in The Persian Gulf States, p. 98.

⁴⁹David E. Long, The Persian Gulf, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 133.

⁵⁰U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 67:1732 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).

⁵¹Foreign Military Markets Middle East/Africa, 1980.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³"The Struggle for Liberation in Oman," p. 26.

⁵⁴Joe Stork, "The Carter Doctrine and U.S. Bases in the Middle East," Middle East Research and Information Project (April 1975) and (September 1980), p. 11.

⁵⁵U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Military Construction Appropriations for 1981, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Congress, 2nd session, 1980, p. 1151.

⁵⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for Fiscal Year 1982, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 97th Congress, 1st session, 1981, p. 501.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 486.

⁵⁸Claude Khoury, "Sultan Qabus: The Gulf's Red Peril," Monday Morning, (Lebanon) 17-23 November 1980, p. 36.

⁵⁹U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Military Construction Appropriations for 1982, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Congress, 1st session, 1981, p. 1075 and Military Construction Hearings for 1981, 96th Congress, 2nd session, 1980, p. 1151.

⁶⁰James Digby, "Modern Weapons for non-NATO Contingencies," The RAND paper series P-6521 (December 1980), p. 7.

⁶¹Gulf News Agency Manama, 7 February 1980 in FBIS Vol. V, (7 February 1980), p. C1.

⁶²Baghdad INA in Arabic 22 February 1980 in FBIS Vol. V (26 February 1980), p. C1.

⁶³Kuwait Domestic Service, 18 February 1980 in FBIS Vol. V (19 February 1980), p. C1.

⁶⁴Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 19 January 1980 in FBIS Vol. V (21 January 1980), p. C2.

⁶⁵Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS AGENCY 14 February 1980 in FBIS Vol. V (14 February 1980), p. C7.

⁶⁶Doha QNA 14 February 1980 in FBIS Vol. V (15 February 1980), p. C2.

⁶⁷New York Times, 28 January 1980, p. 6.

⁶⁸Judith Perara, "The Superpowers Last Stand," The Middle East (March 1980), p. 13.

⁶⁹Graham Benton, "New Roles for Old Drivers," The Middle East (April 1980), p. 20.

⁷⁰Aden Voice of the PFLQ 29 December 1979 in FBIS Vol. V (3 January 1980), p. C2.

IV. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

The purpose of this chapter is to look at one possible solution to the Gulf security problem, the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is considered by some to be one of the most significant developments to take place in the Middle East for many years.¹ This chapter should provide one with an understanding of the GCC, its background, the current issues, and its future. It is hoped that one will realize that the GCC has already assumed a leading role in Middle Eastern affairs and will continue to be an important organization to be watched by any serious student in the Middle East.

A. EVOLUTION

1. Past Regional Organizations

The first regional international organization of any importance which involved Persian Gulf states was the Saadabad Entente, which consisted of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.² The Saadabad Pact was signed on 8 July 1937 at Shah Reza's Garden Palace in the mountains near Tehran and provided for mutual cooperation, consultations, and nonaggression among the signatories.³ The Pact was additionally intended to act as a voting bloc in the League of Nations and did not contain any obligations for collective self-defense. Only three meetings of the Pact's Council (the Foreign Ministers of each country) were held with nothing substantial occurring as a result. Futile attempts were made by Turkey to

revive the Pact following the outbreak of World War II. Nonetheless, the Pact was never formally renounced in accordance with its delineated procedures, and is thus technically still in force.⁴ As late as 1972, Afghanistan considered it still in effect.

On 7 October 1944, in Alexandria, seven Arab states of the Middle East (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Transjordan) signed a protocol in which they undertook, in the near future, to establish an Arab League according to a set of accepted principles. The protocol rejected earlier proposals for a full union, providing instead for an association of sovereign states, yet it stressed Arab unity in terms likely to evoke popular approval. On 22 March 1945, in Cairo, the seven Arab states signed the pact of the Arab League born as the result of two influences: one was British influence and the other was the desire for greater unity and strength.⁵ A quite powerless organization, the decisions of the League are binding only upon those members who vote for them.

Today the Arab League consists of 21 member nations including all of the GCC members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). The purpose of the League is to seek cooperation of member states in economic, cultural, social, and health affairs, in communications, and in matters affecting nationality. It embodies a guarantee of the sovereignty of each member and a promise to respect the systems of government established in other member states and to abstain from any interference in internal affairs of other member states. No collective security or mutual defense articles were included in the initial pact.⁶ In

1950, however, a loosely constructed security pact was accepted, which stated that aggression against any one of the signatories would be regarded as aggression against all.⁷

Arab League actions in the Persian Gulf have been limited by the fact that most Gulf states did not attain their independence until 1971, that there has been almost constant hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and that Persian Gulf security issues have involved, in most cases, extra-regional actors.⁸ The League could be considered a non-political success and could pride itself on considerable accomplishments in the fields of technical and cultural cooperation. The Arab League cannot, however, be regarded as a dynamic vehicle of Arab unity. As far as the Gulf region is concerned, the only political/security issue in which the Arab League played a major role was the Kuwait-Iraq confrontation in 1961-63.⁹

In April 1954 Turkey signed a pact of mutual cooperation with Pakistan; a pact that was hailed as the nucleus for the building of a defense line against the Soviet bloc.¹⁰ In February 1955, a subsequent treaty was signed with Iraq. This became the basis for a regional alliance, to be known as the Baghdad Pact (also known as the Middle East Treaty Organization, METO). In April the United Kingdom signed; and later Pakistan and Iran became the fourth and fifth members. Britain's membership was of momentous significance inasmuch as it introduced the first major power into a pact hitherto linking medium or small states only.

In August 1959 the name of the Baghdad Pact was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and despite repeated appeals from the members, the U.S. never signed the treaty itself, and its closest legal connection remained in the form of three bilateral executive agreements.¹¹ The failure of the U.S. to join CENTO was due partly to America's reluctance to burn the bridges in her relations with Egypt and partly to the protests of Israel, who attacked the Pact as hostile to herself. According to Ralph Magnus, the fundamental reason for U.S. non-membership is that the interests of the U.S., as stated in the Eisenhower Doctrine, require only defense of threatened nations "against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism" and not general defense cooperation as obligated by the CENTO treaty.¹²

The regional members of CENTO had hoped, since its inception, to use it as a vehicle to enhance their security against regional threats. In this way it is a direct successor to the Saadabad Pact.¹³ After the unfortunate experience of the Saadabad Pact in facing the challenge of World War II, the regional members realized that their only effective security against such a powerful neighbor would require the cooperation of the other Great Powers, the U.S. and the UK. The U.S. used to participate in the regular joint military exercises carried out under CENTO, and CENTO, if it had survived, could have been a valuable vehicle to counter Soviet schemes of expansion in the region. In early 1979 Pakistan announced its intention of withdrawing from CENTO, and Iran and Turkey issued statements in agreement with Pakistan that CENTO should be dissolved.¹⁴

An awareness of past attempts at regional cooperation is valuable and would be incomplete without some mention of past Arab unity attempts, which are also germane to an understanding of the GCC. The following is a listing of failed attempts at Arab unity:

- 1940's -- Transjordan's King Abdullah's plan for the creation of a Greater Syria.
- 1950's -- Iraqi Premier Nur Said's unified Fertile Crescent.
- 1958 -- Egypt and Syria form the United Arab Republic followed shortly by the federation of Yemen to the UAR.
- 1961 -- Baathist coup in Syria led to Syria's withdrawal from UAR.
- 1963 -- An Egypt, Syria, and Iraq federation proposed but never materialized.
- 1964 -- Joint Egypt-Iraq military command set up but it collapsed.
- 1969 -- Tentative unity experiment launched between Qadhafi in Libya and Egypt; led to the federation of Arab Republics in 1971.
- 1970 -- The death of Gamal Abdul Nasser was a serious setback for attempts to bring Arabs together.
- 1972 -- Total union declared between Egypt and Libya but Sadat's drift to the West halted any progress. After the Qadhafi "March of the 40,000" to the border with Egypt in 1973, Sadat reacted against being pressured and the union collapsed.
- 1974 -- Qadhafi's "unity with anyone" trail when he declared union with Tunisia; the Tunisians (quite surprised) hastily withdrew.
- 1980 -- Libya and Syrian declared union, but it is still inconclusive, foundering, and virtually nonexistent.
- 1980 -- Following its intervention in Chad, Libya declared that the two states would become one. Chad is very reluctant to implement the union amidst major opposition from the OAU as well as from other Arab, Western, and African states.¹⁵

The foregoing review hopefully reveals that the record of the Arab movement for unification is replete with many gradiose schemes and solemn agreements but it is also punctuated with as many failures. Profound differences between cultural and social levels, discrepancies in economic wealth, and contrasts in ideologies and political structures among Arab states largely accounted for the failures to achieve the desired unity.

The Gulf Cooperation Council seems to be the latest attempt at Arab unity (even though it is not being advertised as such). Enthusiastic supporters of the GCC have described the states as being already 90 percent of the way to unity, and argue that once unity is achieved in the Gulf, it will rapidly encompass the Red Sea and the rest of the Arab world, and ultimately the whole Islamic world.¹⁶ The lesson seems to have been learned that unions based on ideology are fore-doomed to failure, especially since the Arab states have now been established long enough to have developed formidable domestic power centers which are reluctant to relinquish a power for which they have, in some cases, struggled for many years. In this respect, the GCC appears to have a better chance of success than other attempts at unity, since it has steered clear of contentious political and religious divisions, and is building a firm economic base first.

2. Gulf Security Plans

The GCC as it exists today has evolved over several years via several intermediate joint bodies. The Gulf area itself is unique in that it is already more integrated than many federated

states at both the official and popular levels. Indeed, the Gulf can already claim the only unity experiment ever to have endured in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates. There was already considerable cooperation in various spheres which arose from the realization that many problems could be tackled more efficiently in this way. Regular meetings were held, for example, by Trade, Information, Industry, and Agriculture Ministries. Joint bodies have also been set up like the Arab Gulf News Agency, Gulf Television, Arab Gulf Labor Organization, and the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting. Moreover, in October 1980, a joint project was announced for cooperation between Interior Ministries over security matters, traffic, passports, and immigration.¹⁷ The thorniest issue, second only to political coordination, is cooperation over military and security matters. Several Gulf security projects have been put forward since the mid-1970's but all have foundered on the rocks of individual interests and mutual suspicion.

One of the first security plans was proposed by Iran in 1975 but nothing substantial was ever agreed upon by the other Persian Gulf states. At Muscat, Oman in 1976, specific designs for a regional security organization were again discussed, but no agreement could be reached. Between 1976 and 1979 there were no further substantive security plans tabled. Following the 1979 Shiite revolution in Iran, separate plans for the security of the Arab Gulf were produced by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, leaving only the three small Emirates not to have produced

blueprints. On top of this, the regional rulers were offered a Gulf Security Pact to consider by Soviet President Brezhnev in December 1980.¹⁸

In September 1979 Iraq offered to send troops to Kuwait and Bahrain in the event of internal or external threats to the Emirates. This offer emerged as part of an Iraqi plan for general security of the whole Gulf region in that its troops would be part of an Arab Deterrent Force. The main elements of the Iraqi plan were:

"The conclusion of a collective security and mutual defense agreement to complement the Arab League Defense Pact for the seven Arab Gulf states. The creation of a collective Deterrent force under joint military command with a budget separate from those of the armies of the individual states. The creation of a collective Defense force to be considered as an integral part of a Gulf Defense Agreement. Personnel and Financial contributions to the collective defense of the Gulf would be made by individual member states on the basis of their relative wealth and military strength."¹⁹

In 1979 Oman too proposed a plan of a very different kind for the protection of the Gulf. Oman's primary concern was with the protection of the Strait of Hormuz. The plan envisaged the spending of some \$100 million and called for a major role to be given to the Western Powers in carrying it out (namely the U.S., the UK, and West Germany). It suggested the setting up of air reconnaissance patrols, electronic monitoring equipment on both sides of the Hormuz waterway, and a fleet of barges and Gulf patrol ships. The plan had no provisions for the political security of the Arab Gulf states (like the Iraqi Deterrent Force). Allied to the plan was the long-cherished Omani scheme to charge a transit fee to ships using the Strait, in line with Suez Canal transit

charges, but cheaper. Iraq advised against the transit fee and rejected the security plan outright.²⁰

At a conference of the Gulf Foreign Ministers in Taif Saudi Arabia, Kuwait proposed a plan similar to the Iraqi one with the important concept added of an "Arab Interpol" to coordinate controls against internal security threats. It also included new details for oil field defense and a unique "Religious Interpol" which would monitor religious gatherings, mosques, and potentially dissident Islamic sects. By September 1980, there were reports that Kuwait was already quietly implementing some of their plan's provisions.²¹

In December 1980 the Saudis unveiled their "collective security plan" which consisted of five principles forming the basis of mutual security.

1. Collective Arab security is based on the security at home of individual Arab states. If the internal security of one state is endangered, the security of all is threatened.
2. Collective security is attained if all Arab states respond to an individual state's plea for help against local and imported threats and if they stop entry of international criminals to Arab states.
3. The strengthening of cooperation among the police forces of the various Arab states is essential.
4. Saudi Arabia considers that any harm done to the security of one state will affect the collective security of all and, consequently, urges cooperation to establish collective Arab security and deny international criminals and saboteurs access to the Arab society or refuge in Arab countries.
5. Saudi Arabia is willing to cooperate with other Arab states to combat crime and maintain security and stability.²²

Also in December 1980 President Brezhnev presented a five point program which sought commitments from the U.S., other Western powers, China, Japan, and all other interested states to:

1. Not establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf, nor deploy nuclear weapons in the region.
2. Not employ or threaten force against the nations of the region and not interfere in their internal affairs.
3. Respect the nonaligned status chosen by governments of the region; and not draw them into military alliances.
4. Respect the sovereign rights of the states in the region to their natural resources.
5. Not raise any obstacles or threats to normal commerce or to the use of sea lanes linking the Gulf states with the other countries of the world.²³

These proposals did not sit well with the Gulf states who considered that the superpowers, by enacting these proposals, were preparing to sub-divide the area into spheres of influence in a return to colonial imperialism. The Soviet leader's proposals were by and large a propaganda move designed to enhance the USSR's role in the region.

Realizing the obvious disparity among the several plans and the problems involved in obtaining unanimous agreement, the Gulf states temporarily shelved their collective security plans and instead chose to start with simpler cooperation initiatives.

A discussion of nascent Gulf security plans cannot end without some mention of the involvement of the West. After the years of withdrawal from Gulf affairs by the UK, France, and the U.S., it appears that the Western powers are having second thoughts about their role in the area. With the advent of the Reagan administration and strong statements from the White House about

the necessity for a "visible presence" in the Middle East and a clampdown on "terrorist" regimes, the indications are that the Gulf states will not have an entirely free hand in the development of their security plans. Moreover, there is a tacit (yet silent) acknowledgement of this in the Gulf where, despite calls for the superpowers to keep out of the region's affairs, some states (Oman for one) still want to feel the power of Western guarantees behind them. However, one Gulf expert says that the GCC was designed to confront Western pressure for bases through a common front that would both reassure the West that adequate regional measures were underway and prevent Oman's negotiations with the U.S. from going too far.²⁴ It is this writer's contention that the West does have a role to play in Gulf security but they should be patient and discrete and wait for the opportune time. The GCC is still in an evolutionary stage; and now is the time to look at it more closely.

B. STRUCTURE

On 4 February 1981 at a meeting in Riyadh of the Foreign Ministers of the six GCC countries, a proposal calling for the creation of a cooperation committee was approved.²⁵ Gulf officials declared at that time that the GCC will try to mold its member states into a group similar to the European Economic Community (EEC). They would bind their economies together following the EEC principle that merging economic interests could end old rivalries and ensure effective political cooperation. On 14 February 1981 a statement was issued in Riyadh that indicated that the Coordination

Council would include two councils and a general secretariat. The statement said that the Higher Council, formed of the Heads of State, would meet twice yearly and will have its headquarters at Riyadh. On 10 March 1981, at the end of a two-day conference in Muscat Oman, the six Foreign Ministers signed the draft constitution of the GCC and agreed on almost all of the details for the creation of the Council.²⁶ The final approval of the constitution occurred at the first summit of the GCC in Abu Dhabi on 25 May 1981.²⁷ (The texts of the document establishing the GCC and the GCC constitution are contained in Appendix B).

C. SECRETARY-GENERAL

In addition to the formal inauguration of the GCC at the Abu Dhabi meeting, the Secretary-General of the Council was chosen to be the former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UN, Abdullah Yacoub Bishara. He is a Gulf official with an abundance of experience in Gulf cooperation matters. In the early 1970's, he had taken part in talks for the setting up of a defense alliance following British withdrawal from Aden. He also participated in the setting up of the federation which was later to become the United Arab Emirates. He has represented Kuwait at the UN for 10 years, including two as its representative in the Security Council. Of interest, it was at Bishara's New York residence that the U.S. UN representative Andrew Young met with PLO representative Zehdi Terzi.²⁸ Bishara's selection was considered a political master stroke as a means of enhancing the prospects for greater Kuwaiti moderation of foreign policy matters, as well as encouraging greater involvement of considerable Kuwaiti experience

and expertise in GCC activities, than might otherwise have been the case.²⁹

When Bishara was first appointed his comment was, "The baby is just born. There are no teeth to it."³⁰ He explained that in the beginning the Council will try to lay down the basis of future activity on general consensus and collective work. For the implementation of such a collective approach he said it would take more than two to three years. In July 1981 the Secretary-General gave an interview in which he voiced opinions on various issues. The following are some of the more noteworthy excerpts from this interview:³¹

Relations with the U.S. -- "The way the U.S. has treated the Arabs is insulting. We are being taken for a ride and we believe that the best answer to this would be a common Arab policy based on solidarity...we do not see any real hope of improvement in the relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world."

The Rapid Deployment Force -- "We believe that the RDF of the U.S. would directly or indirectly invite the intervention of the Soviet Union to find footholds in the area...we want no military offers from the Western bloc or Eastern bloc. In other words the security of the Gulf should be left to the people of the Gulf alone."

On Future Relations with Moscow -- "It would be foolhardy to say that the relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states will remain as they are. They may develop, they may differ, but I definitely do not rule out any possibility."

These statements are not overflowing with pro-Western sentiment nor do they portend optimistic U.S.-GCC relations. These statements, however, do not tell the whole story. As previously mentioned, the GCC is evolving and the best way to ascertain the direction it is moving is to review the central concerns of the GCC and to see what has been accomplished thus far and what yet needs to be accomplished.

D. ECONOMIC ISSUES

A variety of economic linkages connect the Arab states of the Gulf not only with each other, but also with other Arab states of the Middle East. Although these links are rudimentary, there is growing recognition that the future development prospects for individual states depend on increasing and diversifying economic flows. The links which have grown most rapidly since the early 1970's involve labor flows, financial flows, direct investments, joint business ventures, and the construction of communications, transportation, and other infrastructure facilities.³² Any multi-lateral institutions which had been set up to coordinate these type of economic flows will now be absorbed under the aegis of the GCC. Committees will be (and in some cases already have been) set up to consider the unification of economic laws, the issuing of ID cards, and even the diversification of arms sources.³³

1. Labor

Perhaps one of the most disturbing economic issues confronting the Council is the inter-Arab labor migration problem. Labor flows from the non-oil Arab countries to the Gulf generate reverse financial flows when the laborers involved repatriate their earnings. In addition to remittances, such workers also bring back higher levels of human capital based on the experience and knowledge gained in foreign jobs. In certain Gulf states, aliens outnumber the native population (see Table 1).

A number of multilateral steps have been taken to facilitate labor flows and to deal with labor migration problems on a regular

TABLE 1³⁴NATIONAL AND NON-NATIONAL POPULATIONS OF THE CAPITAL-RICH
GULF STATES (1975)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Nationals</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Non-Nationals</u>	<u>%</u>
Kuwait	472,100	48.4	502,500	51.6
Qatar	67,900	41.2	97,000	58.8
UAE	200,000	41.0	456,000	59.0
Bahrain	214,000	79.3	56,000	20.7
S. Arabia	4,592,500	74.6	1,565,000	25.4

basis. The Arab Economic Unity Council (AEUC) has undertaken a study which projects labor requirements for all categories in the Gulf for the period 1976-86.³⁵ In the medium term, manpower shortages are likely to become a real constraint upon development in both capital-rich and labor-supplying nations.³⁶ In late April 1982, the GCC Immigration, Passports, and Labor Committee of Directors decided to standardize all regulations adopted by GCC member states for immigration, passports, residence, labor, and naturalization. The committee also decided to take measures to furnish the GCC citizens with all facilities to guarantee the freedom of labor, residence, and travel among the GCC member states.³⁷ This should facilitate an equitable flow of labor throughout the Gulf. The Gulf states depend on foreign labor at all levels and especially at the lower levels in public works and industry.³⁸ In addition to being an economic problem, expatriate labor also can precipitate political problems thereby constituting a threat to the stability of the GCC states.

2. Infrastructure

Until the early 1970's, most Gulf countries had direct telephone links with European countries but not with each other. Since then a considerable amount of oil money has been spent to develop communications facilities within the Gulf. Gulf Air (jointly owned by four Gulf states) is a true pan-Arab airline and sets an example for other Arab airline mergers. Moreover, other regional infrastructure plans are being considered including a Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway, a Kuwait-Saudi Arabia-Qatar-UAE railway, and a Saudi-Arabia-UAE road. As the infrastructure in the region develops, interstate economic relations become more conducive and could subsequently strengthen GCC ties.

3. Investment and Joint Ventures

The Gulf oil producers have established a variety of profit-oriented investment companies, some of which are multilateral, to finance investments in the region. Two successful examples include the Arab Investment Company and the Gulf International Bank. Joint ventures by the governments have also been a vehicle for regional cooperation. There are such ventures as the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard, the Arab Marine Petroleum and Transport Company, the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation, the Arab Company for Mining, the Arab Company for the Development of Livestock Resources, and the Gulf Pharmaceuticals Industries.³⁹ A takeover of these joint ventures by a GCC committee would solve the problem of scarcity of experienced managers in the region and also facilitate better management of a heterogenous portfolio of investments. Of note,

\$six billion has been set aside as an investment fund and an arbitration agency has been established to settle any disputes among GCC members.⁴⁰

4. Regional Development Assistance

The Gulf oil producers have extended a considerable amount of concessional and non-concessional financial assistance to other Arab countries in the region. Such help has been provided through a variety of bilateral and multilateral channels. There was the Gulf Organization for Development in Egypt which was set up by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE in 1976. There was also the national development agencies such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Saudi Development Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development. The Arab Economic Unity Council established an Arab Conciliation Board to mediate in disputes arising between host countries, public organizations, and investors from other Arab states.⁴¹ It is here where a collective GCC committee could be installed to add uniformity to development laws and policies.

5. Monetary Linkages

Two attempts have been made to deal with monetary policies in the area. The first was the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) which became operational in 1977. The second was the attempt by several countries to integrate their monetary systems and adopt a unified currency.⁴² The AMF could serve a useful function by laying the intellectual groundwork necessary to move the region toward greater monetary integration. Regarding the unified currency, it is more

likely that one or two strong Arab Gulf currencies will come to dominate. A previously proposed Gulf currency union suffered a setback in 1979 when Qatar unilaterally revalued its currency. It is this type of unilateral monetary policy that the Gulf Council will have to dissuade. It is significant to note that one of the EEC's goals was a common currency; however, it has yet to evolve although the EEC has been at it for years. A Gulf common currency is feasible but it will take time.

6. Industrial Integration

The mid-1970's oil revenues surge led Gulf governments to adopt ambitious industrialization programs. The limited availability of manpower and management resources, however, restricts the number of investments a single government can make. Even though manpower and management can be imported there are a limited number of government officials capable of overseeing these type projects. To date, political conflicts and economic rivalries have limited cooperation. The GCC will slowly alleviate these barriers and through coordination will provide the greatest chance for expanding the economic links in the Gulf. John Duke Anthony has stated that a budding consensus among the GCC's technically-oriented development planners and economists is that the way for the GCC to proceed is via achieving gradual economic cooperation. If successful, the accomplishments in this area should point at some intermediate time in the future to a measure of collective security.⁴³

E. MILITARY ISSUES

As previously mentioned, prior to the existence of the GCC several member states had plans for the security of the Gulf. Once the GCC was on the track of cooperation in economic ventures, the security issue again surfaced. The clearest message now emerging from the Council members is that "defense of the Gulf is the exclusive responsibility of Gulf nations."⁴⁴ It was the alarm engendered by the prospect of superpower confrontation that finally moved the Gulf states to disregard their rivalries and to search for the means to collective security. After Khomeini and the Gulf war, the choice was clear; either defend themselves, or to wash their hands of the whole Gulf problem and let the big powers return to fight over the area in a new type of colonial domination.

1. Defense Problems

Apart from the obvious lack of depth in existing GCC defenses, there are three other basic weaknesses. The most serious weakness is the shortage of manpower and equipment to secure the defense of the very vulnerable Gulf coastal area and to provide any significant reserve. The U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is currently the only possible source of reinforcement on the scale required. The second major weakness relates to Iraq's continuing war with Iran. The better-than-expected performance by Iranian forces has caused several setbacks to the Iraqis. Such setbacks greatly increase the threat to the GCC's northern flank. Infiltration across the Gulf from Iran is likely to increase bringing with it an increased threat of subversion in the Gulf states. The

third major weakness in the GCC's defensive posture is that both northern and southern flanks are vulnerable. The northern one can be secured by an Iraqi victory but, in the longer term, only a linking of the GCC defenses with those of Iraq and a further extension to link with NATO defenses in Turkey is likely to prove adequate security for this flank. The security of the southern flank poses equally serious problems in the absence of adequate ground and air forces to secure control of the vital Strait of Hormuz.⁴⁵ Let us now turn to see what the GCC has done to shore up its defenses.

2. Defense Resolutions

In late January 1982, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan said that the Defense Ministers of the six GCC states made "unanimous secret resolutions" on establishing a collective protective force for the Gulf.⁴⁶ The resolutions are reported to contain the following points:

- Use a AWACS to patrol whole of Gulf in conjunction with joint air defense umbrella.
- Establishment of a joint rapid deployment force comprising the armed forces of all GCC states.
- Establishment of a joint \$1.4 billion military industries organization.
- Coordination of all future arms purchases of GCC states.

GCC Secretary-General Bishara was quoted as saying for his part that collective security "will not leave any gaps for the big powers and foreign countries to infiltrate the region."⁴⁷

As a prelude to the establishment of a collective security force in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is signing bilateral military

agreements with each of the other GCC members.⁴⁸ As of June, Kuwait was the only GCC member which has failed to sign a security accord with the Saudis. It seems Kuwait is wary of Saudi military dominance within the GCC and is dragging its feet.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, there is a so-called Riyadh timetable for the GCC collective defense agreement.

1. Bilateral security agreements with each GCC state no later than the middle of 1982.
2. A bilateral defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain before November 1982, so that bilateral defense accords are signed by other GCC states before the end of 1982.
3. A collective security pact would be finalized by the GCC summit in November.
4. A collective defense agreement would be drafted by the end of 1982 but could be delayed until the middle of 1983.⁵⁰

F. FOREIGN RELATIONS

In addition to the GCC member collective security arrangements, there are also wider security arrangements in the offing with other Arab and non-Arab states providing varying degrees of support. It is in the context of looking at the Council's foreign relations where we find more support for the GCC. It is perhaps best to structure this discussion on a country by country basis with the order of presentation being no reflection of relative priority.

Pakistan -- Pakistan's links with Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf states go back to the earliest days of British association with the Gulf when British interests there were directed from India. Now Pakistan is being groomed for a key defense role in a wide regional strategy under U.S. military directives and Saudi

diplomatic and financial guidance.⁵¹ Pakistan is concerned for the security of its Islamic ally, its oil supplies, and its major source of financial aid and foreign currency earnings; Saudi Arabia. A number of Pakistani airmen and soldiers have enlisted in the armed services of the GCC states (now mainly in Oman where Pakistani workers and contractors are also playing a major part in development projects). Additionally, a special division of Pakistani troops have been assigned to reinforce Saudi forces in the event of either an internal uprising or external threat. In the Saudi view, Pakistan, with its own vital interest in Gulf security, its common Islamic heritage, its current regime being equally as hostile to religious extremism as the GCC states are, and its deep suspicions of Soviet long-term intentions in Afghanistan, has a vital role to play in the defense of the Gulf.

Turkey -- Turkey's geographical position gives it both a vital role in NATO and a strategic position on the western periphery of the Middle East. It is probable that Ankara would willingly allow Turkey to become involved in any U.S. action in the region. The governments of the GCC states are particularly anxious to avoid the risk of turmoil in the strategically sensitive area linking the oil producing states with their major market in the West. Therefore, it was not unusual that Greek-Turkish tension was among the main topics discussed at a GCC Foreign Minister's meeting.⁵² There are some 120,000 Turks believed to be working in the Gulf and an estimated 40 percent of Turkish exports during 1981 were consigned to Gulf states. The loss of Turkey's manpower and industrial and

agricultural potential would be a severe blow to a group of states anxious to reduce their dependence on the West. Although no formal ties have yet been forged between Turkey and the GCC, there is general awareness that, within the Middle East region, their defense interests are almost identical. A strong and stable Turkey securely established within NATO and possibly the EEC would leave it free and well-placed to provide much needed security for the threatened northern flank of the GCC's area of interest.

Jordan -- According to a report in Al Nahar Arab and International, the formation of a Jordanian volunteers' corps to take part in the war against Iran alongside Iraqi forces constitutes the "embodiment" of King Hussein's interest in participating in the political stabilization of the Gulf states.⁵³ In addition, the report said that during King Hussein's visit to Washington (November 1981) the U.S. leaders called for bolstering the role of the Jordanian army in connection with Gulf state stability. The Jordanian military assistance to Iraq is part of a Saudi Arabia-Morocco-Jordan tripartite policy, the main target of which is to put an end to the Iran-Iraq war and reduce the pressures faced by the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. The participation of the U.S. in the tripartite policy is reflected in: the Saudi decision to form a joint committee with the U.S., the U.S. to supply Jordan with weapons, and the visit paid by U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Veliotis to Morocco.⁵⁴ Jordan also plays a role in the Gulf by supplying intelligence support to several Gulf states (including Oman).

Egypt -- There have been several statements and speculations on the possibility of reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold. On 26 March 1982, Arab League Secretary-General Chedli Klibi declared that "we are looking forward to Egypt's return."⁵⁵ This was the first time such a declaration was made by the Arab League Secretary since the Arab League pulled out of Egypt. Egypt, with its powerful military, would be a welcome ally to the GCC. In April and May 1982 favorable statements about Egypt and its crucial Arab role abounded, with Egypt's return to the Arab fold considered to be only a matter of time.⁵⁶ Oman, which already maintains relations with Egypt, is acting as a go-between. Sultan Qabus visited Egypt in May and in a toast to Egyptian President Mubarak he called on the Arab world to forget the past and to restore relations with Egypt.⁵⁷ The drive to return Egypt to the Arab fold has gathered momentum since Israel evacuated the Sinai in late April. Only the radical Arab states of South Yemen, Syria, and Libya and the PLO still demand Egypt break ties with Israel before any reconciliation.

With Egypt likely to be invited back to the Arab camp, Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazala has called for the formation of a pan-Arab military force. The proposed force, according to the Defense Minister, could be funded by a levy of a one dollar tax on every barrel of oil sold by Arab Gulf states. Abu Ghazala's proposal comes at a time when Egypt is once again asserting its onetime leadership role in the Arab world. In April, Egypt reportedly concluded a \$2.5 billion agreement for the supply of military equipment to Iraq. Meanwhile, there are also reports that Egypt will be

invited to join the GCC.⁵⁸ If Egypt does accept the invitation, GCC collective security plans will be greatly enhanced as will Egypt's role in the Arab world.

Morocco -- Moroccan ties with Saudi Arabia have developed significantly within the past year. Saudi Arabia is funding Morocco's increasing arms purchases from the U.S. American strategists are reported to believe that an early and favorable end to the seven-year war with the guerrillas in Western Sahara would leave Morocco free to release more of its French-trained and battle-hardened military manpower to the GCC states. Some thousands of trained Moroccan and Tunisian personnel are reported to be serving in various sectors, including the armed forces, of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. In February, Riyadh and Rabat signed an internal security agreement. The large measure of identity between the Moroccan armed services equipment and the equipment holdings of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states greatly eases the problem of integration.⁵⁹

Tunisia -- Tunisia, with a higher standard of living and a strongly pro-Western tradition, is well placed to provide middle and senior management over a wide variety of activities. Tunisia's armed forces, which recently received a reported \$85 million U.S. military aid package, are already largely equipped with U.S. armaments. With a 12 month selective service system, Tunisia has a useful capacity to provide trained military personnel to strengthen the overstretched resources of the GCC states. Tunisia and Qatar signed a military and technical cooperation agreement in early March and this appears to be yet another move in the opening phases

of a program to link the smaller GCC states with a North African source of manpower. Tunisian volunteers have also been reported arriving in Iraq to join the growing force fighting alongside the Iraqi army.⁶⁰

Algeria -- Algeria's record in maintaining hardline attitudes on Arab-Israeli affairs, its membership in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, and its continuing association with the USSR would in the short term tend to limit Algerian provision of manpower to GCC states like the other North African states. On the other hand, GCC experts add, Algeria's increasing dependence on French and other Western markets for its oil exports and improving relations with the U.S. suggest that in time Algerian manpower resources could be of considerable significance in helping to meet the GCC's medium and longer term needs.

Iraq -- Reportedly, Iraq is being briefed on Gulf collective security by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Riyadh is said to be cultivating Baghdad's gradual overtures to the U.S. and other Western powers. It is not yet clear whether the Saudi-Iraqi briefings on Gulf security would ultimately lead to Baghdad's membership in the GCC. However, just as the Arab Gulf states do not want to be drawn into superpower disputes by joining superpower-linked alliances, they do not want to join and exacerbate each other's quarrels.⁶¹ Iraqi membership in the GCC would most certainly precipitate Iranian action against the GCC. Meanwhile, the major part of the GCC's Foreign Minister's meeting held in Kuwait on 15 May 1982 was devoted to discussing the Iran-Iraq

military conflict and its possible political and security repercussions. The GCC wants more Arab contribution to the efforts to settle the conflict. There are several indications that there will be a call for collective Arab efforts to settle the conflict peacefully, in order to prevent foreign intervention in the affairs of the Gulf region as a result of the continuation of the war.⁶² Another report reveals that there are differing opinions among the GCC Foreign Ministers regarding the threat from the war; some view the threat as imminent while others suggest taking more time to face the situation and contain the threat.⁶³ Obviously, the Iran-Iraq war will continue to be of paramount importance to GCC decision-makers.

North Yemen -- In early May, Secretary-General Bishara briefed North Yemeni President Salih on the Arab situation, the situation in the region and the Gulf, and the GCC's way of handling issues facing the region.⁶⁴ This type of interaction is judged to be a first step toward the possibility of an invitation to join the GCC some time in the future. What the GCC would like to see would be unity in the Yemens; however, this seems to be well over the horizon. In the interim, cordial dealings with North Yemen are in the GCC's interest to help maintain stability on the Peninsula.

France -- The election of the socialist, pro-Israel Francois Mitterand in France has seemed to put the future of France's involvement with the Arabs, and therefore the Gulf states, seriously at risk. In late May Saudi state radio commentary indicated that Mitterand's visits to Israel and the U.S., and Zaire's decision to

reestablish relations with Israel (after French urging) have cast shadows of suspicion on Arab-French relations.⁶⁵ However, the French have been involved in several deals with the Gulf region including increased sales of armaments and industrial products to the GCC states. In December 1981, French Defense Minister, Charles Henru, signed a \$3.4 billion contract to modernize and expand the Saudi Navy and its base facilities. France's expressed willingness to take an equity stake in the proposed Gulf Armaments industry has done much to improve its position.⁶⁶ Additionally, the growing French-trained North African military element in Gulf defenses should undoubtedly strengthen France's position.

United Kingdom -- Early in 1980 then British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington said that Britain was prepared to put a Royal Navy presence east of the Suez again. Baghdad's Al Thawra said this was a pretext covering a planned British return to the Gulf.⁶⁷ Now almost self sufficient with North Sea oil, Britain's interest in Gulf oil is not of the same magnitude of France or the U.S. Nonetheless, the UK intends to keep a finger in the Middle East pie and will not be denied its due role by the U.S. or its old rival France. The UK is the dominant supplier of arms to the Gulf region; however, it is too early to predict what effects the conflict with Argentina will have on Britain's Middle East future.

Soviet Union -- According to a Kuwait political source, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam reportedly has proposed a Gulf-Soviet treaty to the GCC states when he visited in mid-January. There have also been Saudi declarations on the eventuality of establishing

diplomatic relations with the USSR (always mentioning Afghanistan as one obstacle). Kuwait is the only Arab Gulf state which has diplomatic relations with the Soviets and it has been calling for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and other Gulf states.⁶⁸ It is certainly too early to tell which way Gulf-Soviet relations will go and there is only GCC Secretary-General Bishara's comment of not ruling out any possibility, to go by.

United States -- None of the Gulf states can, for both domestic and inter-Arab political reasons, seem to be too close to the U.S. The GCC, therefore, will have to agree on some type of ground rules of cooperation with the U.S. for its public consumption.

It is conceivable that in the event of a direct threat from the USSR, the Gulf rulers would welcome U.S. troops on their territories. But the rulers of these states do not see Soviet forces as the real immediate threat (therefore there is no strategic consensus). Their primary concern is with regional instability and internal revolt which are seen as the imminent dangers. In confronting these threats, Western troops are the last thing the rulers want; such forces would tend to exacerbate any conflict stemming from Islamic dissent. Hence the reluctance displayed by almost all the conservative Arab states to discuss U.S. requests for bases; domestic populations just will not accept Western "infidel" troops.

To develop this point further, there is an interesting contrast in this aspect between the Omanis and their partners in the GCC (and is one of the reasons the U.S. has received base

access in Oman). Oman tends to favor a big role for the West, in the belief that only the West can provide expert security rapidly. It appears that the Saudi and Emirate fears of a Western presence arousing the wrath of the population are based on what happened in Iran to the Shah. But the Omanis have had the experience of the highly efficient crushing of their internal revolt by the British Army and Air Force. Qabus perceives the UK presence as having been good for his regime and internal stability, the others see the former U.S. presence in Iran as having driven the fatal wedge between Shah and people.

It appears, therefore, that if GCC defense plans are perceived as inadequate by Gulf rulers, there will then be a recognition of the necessity to have a U.S. RDF intervention capability. Although the GCC rulers will state and restate their basic opposition to foreign bases, until they see the fruition of their Gulf security measures, they must silently accept the need to provide whatever is necessary to facilitate rapid intervention by the RDF. It is on this thin thread of acceptance that U.S. policy has been hanging. It is this writer's contention that U.S. policy must shift away from this thin thread toward a more substantial foundation. Therefore, a more firm policy directed toward assisting the GCC in its security plans is called for.

The foregoing summary of GCC foreign relations was in no way intended to be all-encompassing. It was intended to provide some of the more salient relationships between some of the more important actors and the GCC states. The evolutionary status of the GCC and

its relations with other countries tends to make the foregoing summary somewhat perishable; however, it is a framework upon which one can build as new events unfold.

G. RELIGIOUS ISSUES

As mentioned earlier, the GCC states are ruled by Sunni Muslims (save for Oman) and as such they are emerging as the front-line if a Sunni-Shiite confrontation develops. The GCC will function as a nucleus for Sunni regimes in confronting Shiite militancy. What is evolving is a Shiite Alignment, with the Iranian regime playing a central role, backed by Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia and other pro-Soviet states sympathetic to the Khomeini movement; and a Sunni Alignment with Saudi Arabia assuming the leading role, backed by the GCC, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and most other Sunni-led regimes (as well as the U.S.).

This development could bring the Cold War to the Arabian Peninsula with the U.S. backing the Sunni governments and the Soviets the Shiites. This could also produce an ironical situation. Israel is attempting to infiltrate the Shiite alignment and could find itself confronting the U.S. Rather than opposing each other in this type of conflict, both the U.S. and Israel might seek only to benefit from divisions arising within the Arab world.⁶⁹ Any discussion of the GCC would be incomplete without some mention of the above potential religious confrontation and it behooves the Gulf analyst to be aware of this volatile aspect of Gulf politics. It is the aim of the next section to reveal some more GCC problems by looking at the anti-GCC groupings.

H. COUNTER GCC MOVEMENTS

1. Aden Alliance

Some political scientists ascribe to the belief that the physical law which states that "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction," transfers easily to the political scene. Those who hold such a view have a prime example to support it in the late 1981 formation of a leftist treaty alliance by radical Middle Eastern states in Aden. In August 1981 the Heads of State from South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya signed a regional treaty of friendship and cooperation. Two of these three countries already have a similar treaty with the USSR. The new group, referred to as the Aden Alliance, is, according to Yemeni leader Ali Nasser Mohammad, taking action against all forms of conspiracy and aggression which threatens the area, meaning of course U.S. influence.⁷⁰

The Aden Pact, as it is called, is divided into three sections; military, political, and economic and has some 28 clauses. All of the clauses are included in Appendix C, but some of the more significant ones are as follows:

- Struggle against the Camp David agreement.
- Provide active support for liberation movements especially those in Somalia, North Yemen, Oman and Egypt.
- Oppose the reactionary security, military, and political blocs in the African and Arab regions (The GCC is considered to be targetted in this provision).
- Sign a mutual defense pact to ensure military and security coordination between the three states.

One of the most significant quotations from the text is that "Any aggression against one of the three signatories will be considered

as an attack against the other two countries and they will defend the country under attack by all possible means."⁷¹

The interesting question, still unanswered, is whether the Aden Alliance was planned in Moscow or Tripoli. The three countries certainly have close relations with Moscow and the alliance has been welcomed by the Soviets. Some reports suggest that efforts to bring Syria, Algeria, and the PLO to the Aden summit failed. If Moscow set it up, then the pact will almost certainly be used as a cover to increase Soviet military strength in the region. Whether the Aden Alliance is a Libyan or Soviet brainchild does not, however, add or detract from the fact that it does exist and is an anti-GCC reaction that the GCC will have to deal with.

2. Shiite Marxist Coalition

The formation of a parallel alliance is also being sought by various Shiite and Communist militant organizations of the Gulf. Nine Marxist and Shiite Militant organizations have agreed to hold a regional congress to discuss a unified action against a new wave of repression anticipated from the GCC member states. The congress will be attended by the following parties:⁷²

- The Baghdad-banned Iraqi Communist Party.
- The Bahrain National Liberation Front.
- The Popular Front in Bahrain.
- The Saudi Communist Party.
- The Shiite National Democratic Forces in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf.
- Iran's Islamic Republican Party.
- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.

-- The North Yemen Communist Party.

-- The Iranian Tudeh Party.

The chief objectives behind this planned Shiite-Marxist coalition in the Gulf are to subvert all of the Gulf regimes and to preempt Khomeini's internal opponents. Iran's HojatolIslam Hadi Modarressi is alleged to be the mastermind of this coalition (he was also the man reportedly behind the December 1981 Bahraini coup attempt).

I. OPINION

The earliest GCC communiqués stressed that the Council was founded on economic, social, informational, and educational cooperation schemes. It has become increasingly apparent that the concern for Gulf security was really the motivating factor in the minds of the founding fathers and continues to be in the forefront of GCC discussions. The GCC seems destined as the Middle East grouping most likely to be responsible for the direction the Arab world takes for the rest of this decade and perhaps into the next. Equipped with the background on the Persian Gulf, Oman, and the GCC including its friends and enemies, one is prepared to follow the events occurring in one of the most volatile areas of the world.

Although the GCC seems to offer some viable solutions to Gulf security problems, it is not the only grouping that should draw U.S. support. The next chapter looks at another alternative direction for U.S. support and that is toward increased involvement by the Western Allies; specifically France and the United Kingdom.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹Judith Perara, "Caution Building in Progress," The Middle East (April 1981), p. 8.

²George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 777.

³Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1979), p. 497.

⁴Ralph H. Magnus, "International Organizations in the Persian Gulf," in The Persian Gulf States, edited by Alvin J. Cottrell (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 177-78.

⁵George Lenczowski, pp. 735-38.

⁶Fisher, p. 663.

⁷Lenczowski, p. 744.

⁸Magnus, p. 179.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Fisher, p. 535.

¹¹Magnus, p. 180.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁵Unity attempts summarized from Lenczowski, pp. 735-64, and Arab Press Service Diplomat Vol. 1, no. 7, May 1981.

¹⁶Arab Press Service Diplomat, May 1981.

¹⁷Judith Perara, p. 8.

¹⁸Arab Press Service Diplomat News Service, Vol. 14, no. 7, 11/18 February 1981.

¹⁹The Middle East (January 1981), p. 16.

²⁰Arab Press Service, 11/18 February 1981.

²¹Ibid.

²²The Middle East (January 1981), p. 16.

²³Bruce, Porter, "Brezhnev's Proposals on Persian Gulf Security," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 475 (11 December 1980), pp. 1-2.

²⁴James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 120.

²⁵Arab World Weekly, 14 March 1981, p. 3.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Arab World Weekly, 23 May 1981, p. 6.

²⁸Ibid., p. 7.

²⁹John Duke Anthony, "The Gulf Cooperation Council," Paper presented to the Annual Convention of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, Seattle, Washington, 5 November 1981.

³⁰Raghida Dergham, "GCC's Secretary-General Bishara," The Middle East (September 1981), p. 36.

³¹Monday Morning 20-26 July 1981.

³²Richard D. Erb and Nebil N. Al-Shawaf, "Economic Integration: Nascent Linkages," in the Arab Oil-Producing States of the Gulf, edited by Richard Erb in American Enterprise Institutes Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. 2, nos. 3 & 4, p. 71.

³³The Middle East, April 1981, p. 8.

³⁴J. Stace Birks and Clive Sinclair, "Some Aspects of the Labor Market in the Middle East with Special Reference to the Gulf States," Journal of Developing Areas Vol. 10, no. 3, July 1976, p. 304. For the effects of these immigrants on society see Ralph H. Magnus, "Societies and Social Change in the Persian Gulf," in The Persian Gulf States, p. 408.

³⁵Erb and Al-Shawaf, p. 72.

³⁶Birks and Sinclair, p. 318.

³⁷FBIS, Vol. V, 28 April 1982, p. C3.

³⁸Arab World Weekly 27 October 1979, p. 17A.

³⁹Erb and Al-Shawaf, p. 73.

- ⁴⁰Arab Press Service, Vol. 14, no. 23, 3/10 June 1981.
- ⁴¹Erb and Al-Shawaf, p. 74.
- ⁴²Ibid.
- ⁴³John Duke Anthony, p. 7
- ⁴⁴Arab Press Service, Diplomat News Service, Vol. 14, no. 12, 18/25 March 1981.
- ⁴⁵Arab Press Service, Strategic Balance in the Middle East, Vol. 3, no. 6, 3 March 1982, pp. 5-6.
- ⁴⁶Arab Press Service, Recorder, Vol. 16, no. 5, 20/27 January 1982, p. 1.
- ⁴⁷Arab World Weekly, 30 January 1982, p. 5.
- ⁴⁸International Defense, Defense Market Service, 1 February 1982, p. 1.
- ⁴⁹Idem., 26 April 1982, p. 3.
- ⁵⁰Arab Press Service, News Service, Vol. 16, no. 2, p. 2.
- ⁵¹Arab Press Service, Strategic Balance in the Middle East, 3 March 1982, p. 1.
- ⁵²Arab Press Service, News Service, Vol. 16, no. 13, 31 March/7 April 1982, p. 1.
- ⁵³Arab World Weekly, 20 February 1982, p. 5.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 6.
- ⁵⁵Arab World Weekly, 3 April 1982, p. 4.
- ⁵⁶Arab World Weekly, 24 April 1982, p. 7.
- ⁵⁷Monterey Peninsula Herald, 10 May 1982, p. 2.
- ⁵⁸International Defense, Defense Market Service, 24 May 1982, p. 1.
- ⁵⁹Arab Press Service, News Service, Vol. 16, no. 12, 24/31 March 1982, p. 3.
- ⁶⁰Ibid.
- ⁶¹James H. Noyes, p. 31.

⁶²FBIS, Vol. V, 19 May 1982, p. C9.

⁶³Ibid., p. C5.

⁶⁴FBIS, Vol. V, 11 May 1982, p. C9.

⁶⁵Monterey Peninsula Herald, 30 May 1982, p. 2A.

⁶⁶Arab Press Service, News Service, Vol. 16, no. 12, 24/31 March 1982, p. 6.

⁶⁷Arab Press Service, Strategic Balance in the Middle East, Vol. 13, no. 23, 3/10 December 1980, p. 7.

⁶⁸Arab World Weekly, 23 January 1982, pp. 1-3.

⁶⁹Arab Press Service, New Service, Vol. 16, no. 14, 7/14 April 1982, p. 5.

⁷⁰Arab Press Service, The Fate of the Arabian Peninsula, Vol. 2, no. 3, 16 September 1981, p. 1.

⁷¹Arab Press Service, Redrawing the Islamic Map, Vol. 3, no. 1, 27 January 1982, pp. 1-3.

V. WESTERN ALLIED INVOLVEMENT IN GULF DEFENSE

Above and beyond the U.S. promotion of a regional defense organization such as the GCC, a second alternative to increasing the security of the Gulf is for the U.S. to emphasize that since Western Europe and Japan have more at stake in the Gulf than the U.S. (especially regarding oil), they should share a greater degree of the burden of ensuring access to that oil. Increased allied participation in Gulf security would decrease the U.S. role and presence and could subsequently help to deemphasize the Gulf as an area of Superpower confrontation. This chapter examines how our Western allies could become involved in Gulf security.

A. JOINT ARMS SUPPLY

Brave statements by various Arab leaders that the Gulf states can protect themselves are undoubtedly somewhat premature, but they are important in reflecting a change of attitude and rejection of Superpower interference in the region. Anti-Western rhetoric by Arab countries vis-a-vis U.S. arms for Omani basing by and large has been aimed at the Superpowers, the U.S., and then the West, in that order of precedence. Therefore, it seems that a U.S. policy emphasizing the West as a whole would precipitate a less vociferous Arab reaction.

The U.S. should not only encourage local initiatives toward security arrangements and be prepared to assist the regional states in achieving their common security goals, but should also persuade

our allies to join in common efforts to develop both economic and security ties with the GCC (if they choose to invite Western support). As has been mentioned many times since the oil crisis, the U.S., as contrasted to NATO, is much less dependent on Gulf oil. There is no convincing reason why the U.S. should try to go it alone in forging ties with the GCC. But there are several reasons for doing so in cooperation with other oil-consuming nations of the West.

There are two reasons which immediately come to mind. Although an American near monopoly of arms supply to the Gulf states would help our balance of payments deficit (arguable in some circles), the long term cost is too great. Our excessive military sales to Iran became a major target of religious and political opposition because they symbolized the military and political commitment of the U.S. to the survival of an unpopular regime. A prudent future arms sales policy would have a better chance of success if the Gulf states understood that the U.S. and its allies were committed to spreading the sale of military equipment among themselves. Such a common Western arms policy might reduce the pressure on Washington from the Gulf states for excessive amounts of American arms.¹

Another reason for a combined or joint Western approach is that increased bilateral partnerships between the U.S. and individual states would tend to entail even greater American omnipresence in the Gulf region. Excessive presence of nationals from any one nation would inevitably become unpalatable to indigenous populations, not only as a perceived infringement on their political

independence, but also an imagined affront to their cultural and religious values. A more acceptable approach then is more Western allies and less U.S.

European states may indeed cash in on their greater political distance from Israel and can in specific cases cultivate their bilateral relations with states in the region to enhance the vaunted division of labor. Britain's contribution to Oman is one example. Potentially, France's cultivation of Iraq, if pursued for alliance rather than narrowly national interests, could be beneficial in weakening the grip of the Soviet Union on that state. The historic roles of Britain in the Gulf and France in Djibouti allow them a presence that is less politically contentious than would be the case of a "new" power. The European's reputation for discretion could allow them to meet the lesser threats that these states may face. Similarly, European states could provide assistance in intelligence, oil installation security, counter subversion, and riot control techniques. In addition, by selling arms to the states that require them not in a competitive but in a coordinated and integrated fashion, the European states could alleviate some of the pressures on the U.S. and assure a more rational means of enhancing Gulf security.

In the past the U.S. was seen as the guarantor of security and the U.S. arms implied a commitment. They signalled to the region its importance and reassured the recipient that a Superpower's weight was behind it. Beginning with Camp David, relations between the Arabs and the U.S. became increasingly disadvantageous.

Recently, when the Israelis expelled the PLO from Beirut, the U.S. was seen in the Arab world as an Israeli accomplice. The U.S. has suffered by association with Israel in the Lebanese war, especially in the eyes of traditionally friendly countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. The perception of American complicity in Israel's invasion has fostered a feeling throughout the Middle East that Washington is not keeping enough pressure on Israel to ease its ever-tightening grip on the West Bank and Gaza. This feeling tends to setback American interests and influence in the region and has even added a greater stigma for an Arab country to be identified with the U.S. In this context, the Europeans have become more attractive. They are willing to sell arms without a fuss, are probably more dependable in meeting smaller threats discretely, and are prepared to make the right noises about Palestine.² France and Britain in particular appear as attractive partners and their individual potential contributions to Gulf defense is covered next.

B. FRANCE

France is the only Western power, apart from the U.S., to have an aircraft carrier capable of providing air superiority against land-based air power as a deterrent or in the event that counter-intervention were needed.³ The French have the largest permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with four heavily-armed frigates, and a command ship based at Djibouti, along with some 4,000 troops, plus about eight other support ships, destroyers, and patrol ships in the region, most operating out of La Reunion

island. Moreover, French naval and air force aircraft exercise regularly out of Djibouti.⁴ Thus, while the U.S. struggles to develop access to and a presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the French already have one. French forces are not 2,300 miles away at Diego Garcia.

The question is, however, whether the French forces would be committed to battle. Neither its allies nor its enemies can be precisely sure of how they might be used in a crisis. Nonetheless, their presence should be as reassuring to the West as they must be unnerving to Moscow and the Aden Pact. The U.S. should suggest to the French that they deploy a French aircraft carrier battle group to the Arabian Sea at least once per year. This could immediately enable a U.S. carrier battle group to either resume a Mediterranean or Western Pacific patrol.

France reportedly has no plans to reduce its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and sees it as valuable insurance for its interests there.⁵ The U.S. should push for an even greater role for the French by encouraging joint naval exercises not only with U.S. forces but also with GCC naval forces (especially the Omani Navy). The Omani Navy has evolved from a small police boat force to a modern coastal patrol force equipped with state-of-the-art fast patrol craft.⁶ With proper training and exposure to other navies, the Sultanate of Oman's Navy could play a larger role in patrolling the Strait of Hormuz and protecting that vital chokepoint.

The French naval contingent in the Indian Ocean also has several amphibious units. Deployment of these amphibious units into the

Gulf on a regular basis would relieve the burden placed on the U.S. Amphibious Ready Groups, who also must be available for Western Pacific contingencies. The French amphibious ships could also be used to train a new force of indigenous Gulf troops which could be molded into a Gulf rapid deployment force. Of course, some of the foregoing ideas may sound somewhat idealistic; however, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to promote this type of allied involvement in Gulf defense. Not just the French but also the British have several roles to play in the Gulf.

C. UNITED KINGDOM

Of all the European powers, none has a more ambivalent relationship with the Middle East than the United Kingdom. This relationship has varied from the seemingly altruistic and idealistic role of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, who, with the benign support of London, gave some "dignity and unity" plus military know-how to the Arab struggle against Ottoman oppression, to the cynical and self-interested Sykes-Picot carving up of the Middle East with France. It also gave the incredible bungling of the Palestine mandate, which has left the Middle East a legacy of wars and strife to this day.

British military policy is now again paying more attention to the Gulf and Southwest Asia. Three programs by which Britain can support American efforts have been outlined.

"One is military training and assistance programs in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Bahrain. A second is the occasional deployment of special air service units, warships and combat aircraft throughout the area. Third, is the deployment of two frigates with tankers and auxillary craft to the Arabian Sea."⁷

Like the French navy, the Royal Navy should also become involved in Gulf naval exercises and training of Gulf navies.

Despite U.S. involvement in Oman, British influence remains strong, and with Omani (and U.S.) pressure may be persuaded to grow stronger. Undoubtedly, Sultan Qabus would prefer to retain the British as his big power supporter. He is reported to like neither the U.S. style of doing things, nor the exposed position that an alliance with a Superpower will put him in amongst his Arab and Iranian neighbors.⁸ Sultan Qabus agreed to take part in the 1982 exercise Jade Tiger under the condition that there would be no publicity. When the Washington Post leaked the story, the Omanis were furious.⁹ It is this type of lack of discretion on the part of the U.S. that causes Oman to favor the more discrete relationships offered by the UK.

Based on historical precedent Britain's role in the Gulf should be confined to Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman where its ties are the closest. Britain's historical ties and rapport with the Gulf states, which allowed the British government to play an important role in the 1978 constitutional crisis in the UAE, should not be allowed to fall into disrepair.¹⁰ The U.S. should not be trying to upstage the British but should instead work together with the British on a multi-lateral British-Omani-U.S. plan for modernization of Oman's armed forces.

A larger British contribution would be welcomed by the Sultanate and other Gulf rulers because it would dilute the connection with the U.S. Financial and manpower constraints rule out a permanent British contribution to the Rapid Deployment Force but British naval

task forces (most certainly including HMS INVINCIBLE) might step up their visits to the Gulf area. In fact, in an early 1981 Washington Press Conference, British Prime Minister Thatcher said that her country and France could participate, with the U.S., in "the formation of a permanent naval force which would reinforce security in the Gulf region."¹¹ She added that this could only be done with the approval and the cooperation of the countries of the region. The U.S. could take this a step farther and propose a multilateral naval force consisting of GCC member state navies and Western allied navies. There is an important constraint, however, which must be emphasized. Too many expatriate advisors (U.S., British, and French especially) in the Gulf can give the impression of Western control over national affairs if the advisory role is allowed to become too conspicuous.

British presence in Oman serves to stabilize the domestic power base of Sultan Qabus as well as provide requisite training and assistance to his military forces. British interests in Oman likewise include military training objectives but obvious political concerns for maintaining a Western influence in the regional balance of power clearly transcend strict military goals. While the UK's "show the flag" is limited by commitments elsewhere in NATO, continued British presence in Oman is the most likely course of action for Her Majesty's Government. As such, the U.S. should foster an increased British role in Oman thereby decreasing the U.S. role.

There seems to be general agreement in the West that there is a need to build up a Western presence in the Persian Gulf region.

What there has not been is discussion on exactly what the presence should be or what parties should be involved. The West does not have a particularly good record when it comes to overseas facilities in the Middle East. In 1958 the Baghdad Pact was expelled from Baghdad with the overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy, in 1969 the U.S. was expelled from a prime airbase when the Libyan Monarchy was overthrown, and in 1978 20,000 U.S. military advisors and technicians were expelled when the Shah of Iran was overthrown.

A similar fate is likely to strike Oman or Somalia, which appear to be the most promising hosts for U.S. bases or "occasional use" facilities as they are politely called. Accordingly, if such U.S. bases are to be established, they should also be expendable. Alternatively, there might be a significantly lower probability of expulsion of British forces than of American ones. The British should be persuaded by the U.S. to regain bases which they previously maintained in Kenya, Pakistan, or the sheikhdoms of the Gulf. For example, there are several proposals being considered by Washington and Islamabad including an upgrading of naval port facilities at Karachi and a new naval facility at Gwadar on the far west coast of Baluchistan, close to the Iranian border and less than 300 miles across the Gulf of Oman from Muscat. London should be included in these discussions. Moreover, it is time for a return of the British east of the Suez in order to facilitate a multilateral Western strategy for security in the Gulf.

Even if the U.S. should have to supply the major contribution to such a strategy, it would still be important for other Western states

to provide national contingents of their own, even if smaller in size and composition, to demonstrate multilateral participation. In addition to the added symbolic strength of an integrated multilateral strategy, further political measures could be taken which might identify those other Western nations who do not contribute military contingents to the enterprise.¹² When specific cases arise where Western support is needed to defend friendly local governments, it would be far more useful for a multilateral declaration of support to be issued even if action devolves on only one of them.

Alas, a multilateral Western strategy for Gulf security looks good on paper but for it to become a reality is a dilemma. Without a major improvement in Western Alliance harmony (one need only mention the Soviet natural gas pipeline), which recognizes the need for both restoring faith in its purposes and in redistributing roles within it, the prospects for a collective allied response to the problems of Gulf security are dim indeed.¹³ An increased role for France and the United Kingdom will only come to pass if the U.S. realizes that it cannot unilaterally protect Western interests in the Gulf. Communications amongst the Western allies must begin before the West loses what little influence it has on the Arab side of the Gulf.

D. OTHER WESTERN ALLIES

While France and Great Britain could and should play larger roles in Gulf security, several other Western allies could also share the burden. Japan, which is most dependent on imported oil, spends very little on defense, a fact which is becoming increasingly annoying to some U.S. officials.¹⁴ Japan has a constitutional limitation on the

size and deployment of its armed forces and it would be unreasonable to expect Japan to become actively involved in Gulf security. Japan could, however, take on added naval, antisubmarine, and air defense roles in Asia that would relieve the pressure on U.S. forces. Moreover, Japan could become more vocal in its support of Western initiatives in the Gulf region therefore showing more Western solidarity (something that has been lacking of late).

Perhaps the Western ally which could be the greatest asset for Gulf security is Turkey. Turkey's military power can indirectly affect the balance of forces required in the region and the speed and assurance with which power projection from the outside could take place. According to a high-level Reagan administration source, "Whereas some strategic planning in the Persian Gulf is a fantasy, planning in Turkey is of the sort that makes for real deterrence of Soviet military might."¹⁵

Turkey is a critical strategic asset not only to the southern flank of NATO but also to Western interests in the Gulf. Turkey, like Oman, is being courted by the U.S. for base usage for the U.S. RDF. What is significant though is that Turkey (more than Oman) is susceptible to government instability and therefore could be an unreliable partner, if the U.S. were to base troops there or even preposition supplies. Therefore, the U.S. should try to strengthen and modernize the Turkish armed forces in order to maintain the stability of Turkey. Turkey is an Alliance member, is democratic, and needy. Turkey's stability will affect the range of choices available to deal with Gulf contingencies.¹⁶ Albert Wohlstetter

sums up Turkey's contribution to Persian Gulf security by saying, "Perhaps most important of all, Turkish forces in Turkish facilities can make a major contribution there."¹⁷

A strong stable Turkey solves alot of potential problems. There are opposing views, however, on the usefulness of Turkey. On the one hand, a major U.S. RDF presence in Turkey is considered by some to be the new "hole card" in the Persian Gulf and the key to the effectiveness of the RDF.¹⁸ On the other hand, Turkey is considered to be another liability with economic problems, a weak military, and its own share of internal government weaknesses.¹⁹ Notwithstanding its weaknesses, Turkey should continue to be cultivated by the U.S. and be encouraged to join with other Western allies in defense of their interests in the Gulf.

There are many corporate ventures where the senior partner has a very low profile and is often not involved in all the corporation's transactions. The U.S. should be the senior partner in the Western Alliance and in this capacity maintain a very low profile while allowing the other members to protect the interests of all. This type of strategy will keep the Gulf from becoming the playing field for a Superpower confrontation. The U.S., as senior partner, should direct and coordinate Western actions but with little direct involvement.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

¹R. K. Ramazani, "Security in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1979), p. 834.

²Shamram Chubin, "US Security Interests in the Persian Gulf in the 80's," Daedalus (Fall 1980), p. 51.

³The Atlantic Council, After Afghanistan the Long Haul, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 67.

⁴Benjamin F. Schemmer, "NATO's Challenge in the Persian Gulf and Middle East," Armed Forces Journal International (November 1981), p. 37; and Michael Getler, "Support of Allies in Persian Gulf Conflict Studies," Washington Post, 11 February 1980, p. 1.

⁵Jean-Pierre Goman, "France and the Indian Ocean," The Indian Ocean in Global Politics, edited by Larry Bowman and Ian Clark, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 202.

⁶Jean Labayle Couhat, Combat Fleets of the World 1982/3, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 447-50.

⁷"Britain Shifting its Key Priority in New Arms," New York Times, 26 April 1981, p. 9.

⁸Arab Press Service Strategic Balance in the Middle East Vol. 13, No. 23, 3/10 December 1980, p. 10.

⁹Time, 25 October 1982, p. 47.

¹⁰Valerie York, "The Gulf in the 80's," Chatham House Papers #6 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1980), p. 21.

¹¹Arab World Weekly, 28 February 1981, p. 2.

¹²The Atlantic Council, p. 68.

¹³Shamram Chubin, p. 61.

¹⁴Washington Post, 11 February 1980, p. 1.

¹⁵Monterey Peninsula Herald, 24 October 1982, p. B2.

¹⁶Shamram Chubin, p. 60.

¹⁷Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf," Survey Vol. 25, No. 2, (Spring 1980), p. 183.

¹⁸Benjamin F. Schemmer, p. 38.

¹⁹Anthony H. Cordesman, "After AWACS: Establishing Western Security Throughout Southwest Asia," Armed Forces Journal International (December 1981), p. 65.

VI. CONCLUSION

When the United States was negotiating for base rights in Oman, it was operating under the perception that these bases were needed to fill a "power vacuum" which resulted from the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. Conventional wisdom held that the Soviet Union would quickly make moves to alter the balance of power in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served quite well to help the proliferation of a "Russians are coming" syndrome. The feeling of the U.S. at the time was that the stationing of American troops in the area would offset the Soviet advantage (thus the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force). The U.S. negotiating strategy, therefore, was to emphasize the Soviet threat and obtain a "strategic consensus" for a regional security perimeter against Soviet expansionism, which included the necessity for U.S. basing in the area.

In a region where independence, freedom from imperialism and foreign domination, and self-sufficiency have been sold as primary national virtues for many years, it is hard to justify the return of Western power and influence. Iran has demonstrated that such tenets may be taken too literally by the people and extended to include freedom from royal, tribal, or dictatorial hereditary overlords as well as from "foreign imperialists." The U.S. policy of trying to obtain bases in Oman has little regard for these regional political realities and sensitivities.

The Omani facilities, that the U.S. is eager to obtain, are of limited utility. The costs of using such facilities include not only the direct payments in arms and economic aid requested by Oman, but also the political price of siding with the Omani elite in the various internecine conflicts in which the region is caught. Coupled with the internal situation in Oman and its dependence on outside Arab support, Oman is geographically desirable, but politically unreliable as an ally.

In addition to the specific problems associated with basing in Oman, Soviet reactions to U.S. attempts to bolster its naval and land-based facilities in the Gulf region are sure to touch off an arms race in the area. Rather than reestablishing U.S. influence, a concentrated U.S. buildup may increase Soviet pressure via client Arab radical states, the Horn of Africa, and in Afghanistan. With the advent of Andropov to power in the USSR, now is not the time to expand an American presence so close to the Soviet southern flanks. During Andropov's consolidation of power period, the U.S. should not push him into making any expansionist foreign policy decisions.

In formulating U.S. policy for the Gulf the Reagan Administration must put more emphasis on the problems and aspirations of the region's peoples than on Soviet adventurism. A "limited U.S. involvement" policy should be chosen that could be implemented with velvet gloves rather than with an iron fist. This is the kind of policy that the Gulf states would like to see applied to secure the conservative regimes. They see the internal threat as basically Islamic reformist, with some leftist backing, whereas the U.S.

exaggerates all dissent in the area to Soviet-inspired, terrorist, and Communist. The rulers fear that the failure of the U.S. to appreciate the subtleties of regional politics will lead them to committing blunders in the region comparable to those of Vietnam or El Salvador, leaving the states the U.S. is protecting in a worse state than before. Gulf rulers are aware of the now notorious U.S. habit of backing "wrong horses" in countries where it wishes to retain influence; Thieu in Vietnam, Lon Noi in Cambodia, Somoza in Nicaragua, and the Shah in Iran. If the U.S. wants to keep Sultan Qabus of Oman off this list, it must reverse its attempts for U.S. basing and pursue an alternative policy for Gulf security.

Although increased Allied participation in Gulf security seems to be a viable alternative, it too has its drawbacks. The West Europeans have for a long time favored the stand-off approach to Gulf security with military power over the horizon and visible control in the hands of the Gulf rulers. The problem with their support of this policy is that the over the horizon military power consisted of the U.S. with very little, if any, Allied participation. Europe, and especially Great Britain, has been made to feel too guilty too long about its colonial past and it will take several rounds of diplomatic urging by the U.S. to get the Europeans involved again in Gulf affairs. One must also question the willingness of the United Kingdom to deploy a naval contingent to the Gulf region. After suffering major ship losses and spending close to three billion dollars in their war against Argentina, the Royal Navy may not be prepared to play a viable role in Gulf security.

There are other disadvantages to reliance on the Western Allies to Gulf security. One of these is the reliability of the commitment. After all, France does not have a good record with its North Atlantic partners and the non-consensus of opinion regarding USSR economic sanctions portends other areas of disagreement. More significant to the Gulf region, is the acceptability of increased Allied involvement. The UK and France might make demands on Gulf rulers for less autocratic rule and more democracy and this would be an unacceptable price for the Gulf states to pay.

The alternative route for Gulf security which offers the most promise is a combination of greater Allied participation and a building up of Gulf Cooperation Council defenses. The Gulf Defense Ministers have conferred several times, since the foundation of the GCC, and they have all agreed to up-grade, expand, and coordinate their respective armed forces. The GCC has virtually unlimited financial resources and the U.S. and Western Allies should coordinate arms sales so that the GCC is put on the right track toward improving its collective defenses. The problems of standardization, procurement, and absorption of arms should be coordinated among the U.S., its allies, and the GCC. A coordinated Western arms transfer consortium should be established to control the influx of arms and training to the GCC member states.

The removal of the stigma attached to an individual country's identification with the West can be accomplished by this type of

collective transfer arrangement. The arms, training, and support would go directly to the GCC from the U.S. and its Allies. The GCC would then coordinate further distribution among its members.

The present combined strength of the armed services of the six Arab Gulf states of the GCC is in excess of 130,000, equipped with over 1,000 medium tanks and 300 combat aircraft. With the use of the Saudi Arabian AWACS aircraft and the development of a linked air defense network, the GCC begins to take on the appearance of a credible deterrent to Iranian (and Soviet client) expansion in the region. Though unable to counter a Soviet move into the Gulf, the defenses of the GCC could be reinforced by a multilateral supporting force outside the region in Europe, Cyprus, or even Diego Garcia. A multilateral naval presence in the Arabian Sea, western Indian Ocean, and East African coastal waters, supported by low-profile harbor facilities (in Somalia for example), could also assist the GCC if the need arises.

The Carter Doctrine defined the Gulf as an area vital to American interests. Therefore, there should be a U.S. policy designed to protect these interests. The current policy of arms for base rights in Oman was a "quick fix" policy initiated by a past administration and served to make the administration look good in the short run. This policy, however, could be inimical in the long run for the U.S. and the world. A new U.S. policy is needed for the area. This thesis has offered alternative policies

which neither force an overall strategic consensus on the Gulf governments nor imply close military support arrangements. It is these types of policies which will, in the long run, survive.

APPENDIX A

THE ARMED FORCES OF OMAN

Army 11,500.

2 Brigade HQ.
1 Royal Guard brigade.
3 artillery regiments.
1 signal regiment.
1 armored car regiment (2 armd car, 1 tank squadrons).
8 infantry battalions.
1 special force.
1 engineer squadron.
1 parachute squadron.
6 M60A1, 12 Chieftain (on lease) medium tanks;
36 Saladin armd cars; 25 25-pdr, 36 105mm, 12 130mm guns;
12 155mm sp how; 81mm, 4, 2in, 120mm mor; TOW ATGW;
4 ZU-23-2 AA guns.

Navy 1,000

3 corvettes (1 Royal Yacht, 2 ex-Neth WILDERVANK).
2 Brooke Marine FAC(M) with 2 EXOCET SSM.
4 FAC(G).
1 log spt ship (amph).
5 LCU
(On order: 3 Province FAC(M) with EXOCET, 4 25-meter FAC(P),
3 SKIMA-12 hovercraft, 1 LCM).

Air Force 2,000; 38 combat aircraft.

1 FGA/recce sqn with 12 HUNTER FGA-6, 4 T-7.
1 FGA sqn with 8 JAGUAR S(O) Mk 1, 2 T-2.
1 GOIN/trg sqn with 12 BAC-167.
3 tpt sqns: 1 with 3 BAC-111, 1 FALCON 10; 2 with DEFENDER,
15 SKYVAN, 1 C-130H.
Royal flt with 1 GULFSTREAM, 1 VC-10 tpt, 2 AS-202 BRAVO trainers,
4 AB-212 hel.
1 hel sqn with 16 AB-205, 2 AB-206, 5 AB-214B.
2 AD sqns with 28 RAPIER SAM.
(on order: 12 JAGUAR FGA; 1 C-130H, 2 DHC-5D tpts;
28 BLINDFIRE radar; 250 SIDEWINDER AAM).

Para-military 3,300 tribal Home Guard (Firqats). Police
Marine Wing: 5 75-ft patrol boats; Air Wing: 1 LEARJET,
2 TURBO-PORTER, 2 MERLIN IVA, 2 BUFFALO ac, 5 AB-205,
3 AB-206 hel.

Order of Battle data obtained from:

The Military Balance 1981-82, The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, 1981, p. 55.

APPENDIX B

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CONSTITUTION

The following is the text of the document signed on March 10, 1981 in Oman which established the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Cooperation Council for the Arab State of the Gulf

Realizing that special realations, characteristics and similar regimes link them; believing in the importance of establishing close coordination in all spheres, especially the economic and social ones; believing in common destiny and unity of objectives; and desiring to realize coordination, integration and closer relations in all spheres, the UAE, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait have decided to establish an organization that will deepen and bring closer relations, ties and cooperation among its members in various spheres.

The organization shall be called the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Its headquarters will be in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia. It will be the means for realizing coordination, integration, and closer relations. It will also draw up regulations covering the economy, finance, education, culture, social affairs, health, communications, information, passports and nationality, travel, transport, trade, customs, haulage, and legal and legislative affairs.

The Council will comprise: a) the Supreme Council to which shall be attached the body for resolving disputes; b) the Ministerial Council; c) the Secretariat General.

THE SUPREME COUNCIL will comprise the heads of member states and the Presidency will rotate in alphabetical order. The Council will meet in normal sessions twice a year. Each member has the right to call for an emergency meeting which may take place if seconded by another member. The Supreme Council will draw up the overall policy of the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it will follow. It will discuss recommendations, laws and byelaws presented it by the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General in preparation for their endorsements. It will also form the body for resolving of disputes.

BODY FOR RESOLVING OF DISPUTES will be attached to the Supreme Council and will resolve existing disputes or any that may take place between member states. It will also be the reference point for the interpretation of the basic byelaws of the Cooperation Council.

THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL will be formed from Foreign Ministers of member states, or any ministers deputising for them and will draw up the basic regulations for the Secretariat General. It will prepare for meetings of the Supreme Council discussing studies, topics, recommendations, byelaws and laws and will draw up the agendas for the meetings of the Cooperation Council. It will meet six times a year (once every two months) and emergency sessions may be held if proposed by two member states.

It will draw up policies, recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination among member states in various spheres and will encourage aspects of cooperation and coordination between the various activities of the private sector.

It will work to encourage, develop and coordinate the existing activities between member states in various spheres. Such activities shall be binding should the Ministerial Council endorse them. It will recommend competent ministers to draw up policies as well as studies.

THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL will be appointed by the Supreme Council which will define the conditions and period of office of the Secretary General who will be a subject of one of the member states. The Secretary General will be responsible directly for all the work of Assistant Secretaries General, the Secretariat General and the correct course of work in the various departments.

The Secretariat General shall have data information apparatus and will prepare studies concerning cooperation and coordination. It will follow up implementation of the resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council by member states; prepare reports and studies required by the Ministerial Council; prepare budgets and final accounts and prepare the draft of financial and administrative byelaws that will make the body commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its increasing responsibilities. The Secretariat General shall have a budget to which all member states will contribute in equal proportions.

APPENDIX C

THE PROVISIONS OF THE ADEN PACT

The contents of the treaty between the three radical states have not been formally released; however, various sources of information have allowed the main provisions to be pieced together.

- Sign a mutual defense pact to ensure military and security coordination between the three states.
- Establish a Defense Council of the Defense Ministers of each state.
- Establish military sub-committees which will be attached to the Higher Council of Heads of State.
- The exchange of material assistance between the three state.
- The exchange of help to each state to help it meet the provisions of its planned development programs.
- The promotion of trade between the three countries.
- The coordination of trilateral economic policies at international and regional meetings of relevant organizations.
- Struggle against the Camp David agreements.
- Provide active support for liberation movements, especially those in Namibia, South Africa, the Sahara, Somalia (under the leadership of the National Salvation Front), North Yemen (under the leadership of the National Democratic Front), Oman (under the leadership of the PFLO), Sudan and Egypt (under the leadership of "progressive movements").
- Oppose the establishment of American bases in the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa.
- Oppose the "reactionary security, military, and political blocs in the African and Arab regions.
- Reject the presence of foreign fleets in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean.
- Present a coordinated stand at international conferences.

- South Yemen and Ethiopia unconditionally support the Libyan stand on Chad.
- Take steps to deepen alliances with progressive states in the region and with the socialist bloc.
- Support the Palestinian cause and the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state on its national soil.
- Form a political committee comprising the Foreign Ministers of the three countries to meet on a regular basis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Conversations with Harold H. Saunders. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982.
- American Foreign Policy Institute. The Impact of the Iranian Events upon Persian Gulf and U.S. Security. Washington: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979.
- Becker, Abraham S.; Hansen, Bent; and Kerr, Malcolm H. The Economics and Politics of the Middle East. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1975.
- Bill, James Alban. Politics in the Middle East. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
- Burrell, R.M. The Persian Gulf, The Washington Papers. London: Sage Publications, 1972.
- Clements, Frank A. Oman: The Reborn Land. London: Longman, 1980.
- Gordon, Murray, ed. Conflict in the Persian Gulf. New York: Facts on File Inc., 1981.
- Grummon, Stephen R. The Iran-Iraq War. The Washington Papers. New York: Praeger and Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University, 1982.
- Gulf Committee, ed. Documents of the National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf. London: Russell Press Ltd., 1974.
- Hitti, Phillip K. History of the Arabs. London: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
- Hurewitz, J. C., ed. Soviet American Rivalry in the Middle East. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
- Lenczowski, George. Political Elites in the Middle East. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978.
- Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East and the West. New York: Harper, 1964.
- Mansfield, Peter. The Arabs. London: Pelican Books, 1979.

Novik, Nimrod, and Starr, Joyce, eds. Challenges in the Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1981.

Tahtinen, Dale R. Arms in the Persian Gulf. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Persian Gulf Situation. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 97th Congress, 1st Sess, 17 Sep 1981.

U.S. Department of Defense. The Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Arlington: American Forces Information Service, June 1980.

U.S. Department of State. U.S. Relations with Persian Gulf States. Current Policy No. 2/5, 3 Sep 1980.

Wilson, Rodney. The Economics of the Middle East. New York: Holmes and Meier Inc., 1979.

Articles

Anthony, John Duke. "The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: The Arab Side of the Gulf." The Security of the Persian Gulf edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

Cahn, Anne Hessing. "United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-1976: A Critical Examination." Great Power Intervention in the Middle East edited by Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer. Pergamon Press, 1979.

Campbell, John C. "The Gulf Region in the Global Setting." The Security of the Persian Gulf edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

Cottrell, Alvin J. and Moorer, Thomas H. "The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance." Strategic Review Spring 1980.

El Mallakh, Ragaei. "Economic Requirements for Development, Oman." Middle East Journal Spring 1973.

Harrigan, Anthony. "Security Interests in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean." The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West. edited by Patrick Wall. London: Stacey International, 1975.

Hijab, Nadia. "Gulf Council Shifts into Second Gear." The Middle East October 1981.

- Johnson, Thomas M. "Oman: Critical to the Western World's Oil Supply." Armor Jan-Feb 1981.
- Kemp, Geoffrey. "The Strategic Balance and the Control of the Persian Gulf." The Security of the Persian Gulf. Edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- McLaurin, R. "Political Impact of U.S. Military Force in the Middle East." Washington: American Institutes for Research, 1977.
- Meadowes, Ian. "Who Will Police these Shores?" The Middle East Oct 1980.
- Nakleh, Emile A. "Political Relations Among the Arab Gulf States: Developments and Prospects." The Arab Oil-Producing States of the Gulf. Edited by Richard Erb. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.
- O'Neill, Bard E. and Brundage, William. "Revolutionary Warfare in Oman: A Strategic Appraisal." Middle East Review Summer 1978.
- Tahtinen, Dale. "Arms Across the Sea." Sea Power April, 1981.
- Van Hollen, Christopher. "Don't Engulf the Gulf." Foreign Affairs Summer 1981.
- Wright, Claudia. "India and Pakistan Join in Gulf Game." The Middle East June 1981.
- Yorke, Valerie. "Gulf Security in the 1980's." Middle East Review 1981. Edited by Graham Hancock. Essex: World of Information, 1980.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3. Center for Naval Analyses 2000 North Beauregard Street P.O. Box 11280 Alexandria, Virginia 22311	1
4. Department Chairman, Code 56Bc Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
5. Associate Professor R. H. Magnus, Code 56Mk Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
6. Honorable Edward F. Henderson American Educational Trust Suite 500 981 16th St. NW Washington, D.C. 20006	1
7. John Duke Anthony American Educational Trust Suite 500 918 16th St. NW Washington, D.C. 20006	1
8. Alvin J. Cottrell Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University 1800 K Street NW Washington, D.C. 20009	1
9. Major Alan Nenninger, USA CCAG HQ, RDJTF MacDill AFB, Florida 33608	1

	No. Copies
10. Rudolph A. Gawlik 2852 W. 98th Street Evergreen Park, Illinois 60642	1
11. LCDR Joseph A. Gawlik, USN Carrier Group Seven Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 96601	2

200404

Thesis


G25435 Gawlik

c.1

Persian gulf security:
the United States and
Oman, the Gulf Cooper-
ation Council, and
western allied
particiaption.

thesG25435

Persian gulf security :



3 2768 001 01005 1

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY